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I.

INTRODUCTION

With the end of the Cold War-the principal international political
framework that shaped the international system since the end of
WWII-an increasing number of global tensions have arisen which have
brought to the fore questions about the ability of existing international
law to provide a guiding framework for state behavior. Debates over the
limits of state sovereignty, the appropriateness of humanitarian intervention,
the justness of pre-emptive war, the definition of self-defense, the
legality of replacing a government in the interests of your ideals, and
how to deal with terrorism have dominated discussions around the world.
Moreover, these discussions have caused stark disagreement among states,
even traditional allies.'
Some of these issues, particularly those
surrounding the concept of "just war" have become so hotly debated that

1. In the case of the Iraq intervention in 2003, in particular, there was much
publicity on the rift in opinion between the United States and United Kingdom on one
hand, and France and Germany on the other. Such disagreements have also been seen in
the case of the Kyoto protocol, where Australia and the United States are on one side,
and the majority of Europe on the other.
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they have even moved from the traditional realm of international law
(academia and government) into the mainstream media for debate.2
This debate has, in turn, raised questions as to whether, in the postCold War world, international law can still solve problems and provide a
framework for determining correct forums for discussion and forms of
action, or whether all the new global circumstances and the myriad of
problems present at the beginning of the 21 st century make international
law obsolete? 3 To answer these broader questions, focus must be directed
on three more specific issue-areas which must be addressed. First, in a
post-Cold War world, and even more specifically in a post-9/11 world,
can international law serve as guidance for state action? Put another
way, can a legal system based on the consensus of a large number of
extremely varied states provide guidance as to the appropriate form of
action for the new and increasingly complicated problems of the modern
world? The international system that developed in the years following
World War II was one constructed out of a largely bi-polar world in
which conflict was clearly defined and outcomes relatively predictable
along ideological lines. Rogue states and individual groups were kept in
check by the presence of the two superpowers and limited freedom and
resources. International law served as a means by which the international
community could provide some commonality and stability, and the
recognition and use of international law during this period was relatively
high. On the contrary, the international system today is one in which
new actors operate within a more open, globalized society, increasing
the possibility for both positive and negative interactions. Improved
technology has allowed for the creation, not only of new weapons of
mass destruction, but also the means by which groups can disseminate
information, move resources, and seek to influence the global balance of
power without regard for the rules of international law. This has caused

2. For example, a recent search of the NY Times online for articles concerned
with the concept of just war in conjunction with the 2003 Iraq invasion brought several
dozen articles for the period from January 1, 2002 to March 1, 2006. Authors of these
pieces include Senator John McCain (The Right War for the Right Reasons, N.Y. TIMES,
March 12, 2003) and former President Jimmy Carter (Just War--or a Just War?, N.Y.
TIMES, March 9, 2003).

3. The debate has become so prominent in the field that the American Society of
International Law, the largest and most prominent international legal organization in the
world, is focusing its 2007 annual convention on the topic "The Future of International
Law," asking participants to address these very questions. See American Society of International
Law, http://www.asil.org.

many to question whether international law can survive and be useful for
the 21 st-century international system.
The second specific question we must consider is whether, if you
accept that international law is still relevant today, how is it to be
defined in light of the ever-changing global context? The past several
decades have seen a tremendous increase in the number of international
treaties, agreements, declarations and other documents that have been
promulgated, coupled with expanded activity by the United Nations and
various regional agencies, all of which use international law as their
basis for action. Unlike the immediate post-WWII era, however, many
of the modern principles of international law are agreed upon only in the
vaguest of terms, leaving much room for interpretation and many
questions as to the binding nature of such principles. Many criticize
modern international law as being too soft for not, providing enough in
terms of compliance requirements and enforcement mechanisms. Others
counter that only by beginning with vague principles can we expect the
varied states of the international community to agree on any law, and
that the soft law is only the first step to codification of concrete legal
rights and obligations.
A third critique centers around the question of whether international
law is simply no longer relevant. This position suggests that international
lawyers expect too much and spend too much time focused on what the
law should be without taking into account what the law is, and more
importantly, what expectations are actually feasible for international law.
How can we expect states to accept and abide by international legal rules
that in no way bear any relevance to what they consider to be either
legally appropriate or politically acceptable? Failing to understand the
political components of international law has resulted in the dangerous
position of international law becoming useless to the government and
non-government officials, policy-makers, judges, and lawyers who seek
to use international law on a daily basis.
Each of these issue areas brings to the fore an important question
regarding the efficacy of international law in the 21st century; however,
it would be a mistake to follow the easy path of simply assuming
international law is not longer relevant. Rather, we must find a way to
address the issues in terms of our modem capabilities and beliefs. So,
how then do we address these questions in light of our post-Cold War,
post-9/1 1 world? Given the concerns outlined above, is there any hope
left for international law in the face of such fundamental changes or are
those critics declaring international law to be of no use in the new
international system correct?
To answer to these questions, I suggest that those critics who argue
that international law is dead view the role and importance of international
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law in the international system too simply. International law is not illequipped to address the new set of circumstances in which we find
ourselves at the beginning of the 21st century. International law is a
foundation of the international system, one of its constituting factors,
4
and the foundations will not fall because of one moderate trembler.
Rather, I suggest that a better understanding of these foundations provides
us with an appreciation of the historical continuity underpinning
international law, and a view that today's supposed rifts are not as earth
shattering as they may seem at first glance.
The same questions facing us today have, in fact, been faced before.
The long history of international law has seen a periodic questioning of
the purpose of international law in conjunction with shifts in the
international system. Those that have gone before, however, have not
given up on international law. Rather they have re-focused and adapted
international law to the new circumstances through both an affirmation
of the ultimate purpose of international law, an expansion of the substance
and procedure of international law as necessary, and an understanding of
how much worse the alternative (i.e., a world without international law)
would be.
The global system is clearly at a new point in its history. We have
new actors, new relationships, and new causes of concern. The end of
the Cold War has brought about a shift that requires new thinking about
international law and how it can be used to address contemporary
problems. As evidenced by the debate over the appropriate use of
anticipatory intervention in self-defense surrounding the proposed U.S.
action in Iraq in 2002 and 2003, some states are advocating that the
bounds of international law must be pushed outward, whereas others
argue that international law has not yet taken steps in that direction and
does not change so rapidly.5 Given the nature of international law,

4. ALBERICO GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI LIBRI TRES 7 (John C. Rolfe trans.,
Carnegie Classics 1933) (1612) [hereinafter DE JURE BELLI] (As Gentili himself said,
"Because many act contrary to justice, justice is not therefore non-existent; and a law

which many transgress is none the less a law ... ").
5. This can be seen in the debate over the precise meaning of Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter, in which some countries argued that it could be taken to
incorporate pre-emptive self defense and other states felt that the article was more
limited. For an in-depth discussion of the debate of the meaning of Article 51, see
Frederic L. Kirgis, Pre-emptive Action to Forestall Terrorism, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF

(ASIL) INSIGHTS, (June 2002) http://www.asil.org/insights/ insigh88.
htm. The American Society of International Law has a number of additional pieces by
INTERNATIONAL LAW

however, many argue that there is no guidance to be found because there
is a limited body of international law in which to find such answers, and
thus international law is no longer suited to the modem international
system.
International law is not obsolete, however, and moreover this is not
the first time in history that an overabundance of new situations and
problems among states has given rise to questions about the force of law
and whether international law is viable. Looking to history, we can see
evidence of similar circumstances and similar questions being posed
regarding the international legal system. We can also, however, see the
solutions proposed by those international scholars who came before us
which contributed to the sustainability and development of international
law as a whole. And while certainly not providing answers to all the
concerns currently facing the global community, I suggest that we gain
insight into what is fundamentally the continuing and lasting importance
of international law in the international system by examining the history
of international law, and how times of major change were addressed by
our predecessors.
Specifically, this paper looks at one particularly important period in
the history of the global community-the late 16th and early 17th
centuries, a period for which I will use the term Renaissance-and one
particular legal writer, the Italian-born scholar and jurist Alberico
Gentili. 6 Gentili is a pivotal figure in the canon of international law, and
one not well known in the United States. His contributions are particularly
important for addressing the concerns about international law prevalent
today for a number of reasons. First, the period in which Gentili lived
and worked was one of shifting global dynamics just as our own period
is today. The creation of new states, new actors, and the shifting global
power structure was as relevant for Gentili in his consideration of
international law as it is for the modem international lawyer. Second,
Gentili was addressing international law at a time in which the substance
and method of international law was changing. New discoveries,
international law experts focused on this debate. See generally American Society of
International Law, http://www.asil.org/insights.htm.
6. I use the term Renaissance here to classify the period (1552-1608) in which
Alberico Gentili lived and wrote. There is no general consensus on the exact time period
of the Renaissance. Others may choose to call this period of Gentili's life the Late
Renaissance or the Reformation. However, overall consensus is that the Renaissance in
Europe began in Italy in the mid-15th century, and spread northward to Europe, reaching
England in the 16th century. Overlapping with the Reformation, which began with
Luther's actions in Wittenburg in 1517, the Renaissance led directly to the period of
Enlightenment. The first half of the 16th century saw the actual occurrence of many of
the key changes. See generally ANDREW HADFIELD, THE ENGLISH RENAISSANCE: 15001621 (2000); MARGARET L. KING, THE RENAISSANCE IN EUROPE (2004).
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particularly the discovery of the Americas and what this meant for
European understandings of humanity coupled with the growing desire
by people for stable, supportive government and the rule of law changed
the way in which valid law was viewed in Gentili's era. New forms of
international law, legal method, and compliance methods were all considered
during Gentili's time to address these discoveries and changes, just as
they are today. Third, Gentili was one of the first international legal
scholars who understood that international law, to be effective and
valuable, has to be more than theoretical notions about what should be;
international law has to address the best way to deal with the reality of
what is, while at the same time setting the stage for future development.
Obviously Gentili's world differed greatly from our own and I neither
suggest a reading of his works can provide us with absolute answers, nor
that he was in some way predicting the current state of the world through
his own work. I do suggest, however, that there are a number of similarities
in the debates over the proper status and value of international law which
arose during Gentili's lifetime that have resurfaced today. Given this, an
examination of his approach to addressing these concerns and his view
of the role that international law can play in creating a more stable world
offers a reinforcement in our own uncertain time. Even an overview
examination of some of Gentili's most famous works illustrates the enduring
strength of international law. Gentili is a particularly important figure in
this regard because, while perhaps not as famous as his successors, he7
was one of the key figures during this period of great historical transitions.
He advocated a body of international law that was designed to address
the real problems of the day, and thus served to lead the community of
states through times of chan e and strife, rather than break down and
forgo the rule of law altogether. A refutation or abandonment of international
law was not the solution Gentili advocated as it would simply result in
an international system of states whose lifespan was "solitary, poor,

7.

Ernest Nys, Introduction to ALBERICO GENTILI, DE LEGATIONIBUS LIBRI TRES

31a (Gordon J. Laing trans., Carnegie Classics 1924) (1585) [hereinafter GENTILI, DE
LEGATIONIBUS LIBRI TRES] (The works of Alberico Gentili are "a juridical commentary
upon the events of the sixteenth century and.., all the great controversies between
Charles V and Francis 1,between the Netherlands and Spain, between Italy and her
oppressors were studied by him from the point of view of public law.").
8.
See E.B.F. MIDGLEY, THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION AND THE THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 114 (1975).

nasty, brutish, and short". 9 This is the same position that this paper suggests
is needed today, in our own period of conflict and change. International
law is not dead, but we need to acknowledge the difficulties created by
the changes in the international system since the end of the Cold War
and assess how best to adapt international law to address modern needs.
The remainder of the paper will proceed as follows. First, I will
provide a brief biographical account of the life of Alberico Gentili. An
understanding of the major events in the scholar's life is crucial to
explain his unique position to address the concerns of his era about the
viability of a system of international law. Second, I will turn to the
period in which Gentili lived, highlighting some of these concerns as
born out of the global changes and rise of new tensions between the late
16th and early 17th centuries that allow for a comparison with our own
time. This period of history was witness to major shifts in not only the
political structure, but also economics, religion, and social relations, all
of which influenced international relations and brought into question the
position of international law. Third, I will turn to an analysis of Gentili's
principal works, highlighting how he addressed the concerns dominating
his time and illustrating how Gentili's work both accommodated the
critics of the usefulness of international law in the new global system
and strengthened the international legal tradition while building on it and
adapting it to the circumstances of his time.10 Specifically, there are ten
tenets which I suggest may be culled from Gentili's works which speak,
not specifically to individual crises, but rather work together as a general
framework for understanding how international law can develop alongside a
changing international community of states in order to remain relevant.
These ten tenets form the core of Gentili's work on international law,
and are foundations upon which later scholars continue to build. Fourth,
I will return to the modem era, re-examining Gentili's ten tenets in light
of our current international system and contemporary concerns about the
usefulness of international law. In doing so, I seek to demonstrate, not
only the uniqueness of Gentili's vision in understanding the importance

9.

THOMAS HOBBES,

LEVIATHAN

(Oxford Press 1909) (Gentili was still a

professor at Oxford at the time that Hobbes matriculated at the university although it is
uncertain whether the two ever actually met.).
10. This paper is not intended to be an in-depth analysis of Gentili's various
works. Rather I will be drawing from Gentili's various publications-most particularly
his DE JURE BELLI LIBRI TREs-for illustrations on how he addressed the vast number of
new issues confronting European civilization at the turn of the 17th Century. I do this,
not with the goal of providing the reader with a complete picture of Gentili's
contribution to international law, which would involve far more discussion, but rather to
demonstrate how Gentili dealt with a time of rapid change in hopes of providing
illumination to our own period.
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of international law as a component of the international system, but his
recognition that without international law we would be much worse off.
II.

ALBERICO GENTILI: AN ITALIAN PROTESTANT IN
QUEEN ELIZABETH'S COURT

Open any casebook on international law in the United States and it is
unlikely that reference will be found to Alberico Gentili. Mention will
most certainly be made to the Dutchman Hugo Grotius, and one may
find other names from later times such as Pufendorf, Vattel, or Kant. In
fact, in many cases, it is Grotius who is graced with the moniker of
"Father of International Law."'' If one looks closely at history, however, it
becomes evident that perhaps Grotius alone cannot claim that title, even
though his works are certainly monumental in the canon of international
legal texts. 12 A closer examination in fact reveals an earlier source as
the root for many of modern3 international legal principles-Grotius'
predecessor Alberico Gentili.1
11.

INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 7 (Richard Falk, Friedrich

Kratochwil & Saul H. Mendlovitz eds., 1985).
12. Coleman Phillipson, Introduction to ALBERICO GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI LIBRI
TRES 12a (John C. Rolfe trans., 1933) (1612) ("Strictly speaking, however, no writer can
be truly described as the 'progenitor' or 'forerunner' or 'creator' of international law.
The present writer has shown elsewhere that modern international law-making all
proper allowance for its greater comprehensiveness, more solid basis and more
determinate character-is by no means a new creation, but partly a reassertion and
refinement of ancient customs and institutions. Indeed, Gentili and Grotius and all the
earlier writers on the law of nations constantly appeal to the classical timers for
authority, for rules and principles, for practices, for analogies, and for all kinds of
illustrations.").
13. Thomas Willing Balch, Albericus Gentilus, 5 Am.J. INT'L L. 665, 677 (1911)
("The passage of time has amply justified him [Gentili) for holding for the period in
which he lived liberal views. Though in large measure forgotten and decidedly
overshadowed for more than two centuries and a half by the phenomenal homage
accorded in Europe to the larger work of Hugo Grotius ...it must not be forgotten that
the work of the Italian, and adopted son of England, prepared the ground for the
work ... of the Hollander."). It must also be noted here that one of the keys to Gentili's
importance as a guide for adapting international law today to the changing global system
is the fact that he is a modern writer. Those scholars writing about international law
prior to Gentili remain rooted in the Medieval period, and base their theories thusly on
the structure of the Medieval world; the domination of the Church, the singular authority
of the Catholic religion, and the feudal political and economic system. These attributed
make the pre-Renaissance period less able to provide guidance for our own time.
Gentili, on the other hand, writing at the beginning of the modern political and economic
system - the beginnings of globalization-writes about changes that are not all that
different at their core from those we are experiencing today. For further discussion of
Gentili's modernity, see infra Section IV(I).

Born in the town of San Ginesio, in the Marche region of Italy on
January 14, 1552, Alberico Gentili was the first of seven children of
Matteo Gentili, a physician, and Lucretia Petrelli.14 Alberico was homeschooled by his father, with a course of instruction that included Latin
and Greek.' 5 Alberico was sent to university at an early age to study law
and attended the University of Perugia, one of the most famous law
schools in Italy at the time.' 6 Graduating from Perugia at the age of 20,
Gentili served as a judge in the Marchese town of Ascoli before taking
up advocacy work in his hometown of San Ginesio, serving as a
consultant in "matters relatingto municipal statutes and institutions. ,17
Despite enormous intelligence and success in his work in Italy, Alberico
who, along with his father, had embraced Protestantism, was forced to8
leave Italy in 1579 to avoid persecution by the Italian Inquisition.1
After traveling through Germany and Austria, Alberico arrived in England
in August 1580.19
Alberico Gentili arrived in an England with a thriving Italian Protestant
community.20 Moreover, England at the time, under the reign of Queen
Elizabeth I, was a country in which both Italians and Protestants were
welcomed, and Italian civilization was high fashion at court. 21 Having
made the acquaintance of a number of prominent Englishmen, including
the Queen's Italian teacher,2 2 Gentili was admitted to Oxford University,
qualified as a reader in civil law, and received at New Inn Hall.23 Gentili
quickly became established within the Oxford community and began to
produce an extensive amount of scholarly material on a range of subjects,
including politics, theology, morality, and the theater, among others.24
14.

Balch, supra note 13, at 668. See also GESINA VAN DER MOLEN, ALBERICO
36-37 (A.W. Sijthoff-Leyden

GENTILI AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

1968). For a more extensive biography of Gentili, see id. at 35-63.
15.

VAN DER MOLEN,

16.

Id.

supra note 14, at 37.

17. Phillipson, supra note 12, at 12a; Balch, supra note 13, at 668.
18. Balch, supra note 13, at 669; Nys, supra note 7, at 13a ("In 1579 the storm fell
on Matteo Gentili and his eldest son. Both were prosecuted as heretics by the tribunal of
the Inquisition; several family members were implicated in the trial; the case ended at
Rome on February 2, 1581, by the condemnation of the accused to life imprisonment and
the confiscation of their property.").
19. Balch, supra note 13, at 669.
20. For the best account of Gentili's life and work in Elizabethan England, see
DIEGO PANIzzA, ALBERICO GENTILI, GIURISTA IDEOLOGO NELL'INGHILTERRA ELISABETrIANA
(1981).
21. 11(2) OXFORD TODAY: THE U. MAG. (1999); VAN DER MOLEN, supra note 14,
at 48 (Gentili "counted his friends from among the highest circles in the country and
probably was even received at court, where Elizabeth liked to see the distinguished
Italians, whom she admired because of their culture.").
22. Nys, supra note 7, at 17a.
23. Phillipson, supra note 12, at 13a; Balch, supra note 13, at 669.
24. Phillipson, supra note 12, at 14a.
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As a result of his improved position and breadth of knowledge, Gentili
was consulted in 1584 by the English government on a question of
diplomatic difficulty. The Spanish Ambassador to England, Don Bernadino
Mendoza, was accused of participating in the plot to liberate Mary Stuart
and depose Queen Elizabeth 1.25 The question put to Gentili and his colleague,
French jurisconsult Jean Hotman, was whether Mendoza should suffer
punishment in England for his crime, or whether he should be returned
to Spain. 6 Gentili, despite his own distaste for the conduct of the Spanish
Ambassador in interfering with the government of England, argued that
the law of nations requires that diplomats be protected under the principle of
inviolability. 27 Therefore, Mendoza should be returned to Spain, his
punishment being banishment from English soil. 28 The English government
followed 29Gentili's recommendation, despite earlier precedent to the
contrary.

The Mendoza affair brought Gentili renown within the legal and
diplomatic circles and Gentili, not yet Regius Professor at Oxford, was
invited to deliver a discourse at graduation. 30 Given his recent experience in
the Mendoza affair and because the decision was still fresh in the
public's mind and not necessarily the most popular decision, Gentili's
lecture was widely received. 31 This ultimately led to the publication, in
July 1585, of Gentili's first major work De Legationibus Libri Tres
('Three Books on Embassies'). This work comprised three books devoted
to the definitions, concepts, and history of legates and embassies; the rights
and duties of embassies and punishments for wrong-doing; and the
qualifications of ambassadors, respectively.

25. Balch, supra note 13, at 669.
26. Nys, supra note 7, at 21a-22a (The Mendoza affair is "a celebrated case in the
history of the Law of Nations.").
27. GENTILI, DE LEGATIONIBUS LIBRI TRES, supra note 7.

28. Phillipson, supra note 12, at 13a.
29. Balch, supra note 13, at 670 ("How sound the advice of the two doctors
[Gentili and Hotman) was, the lapse of more than three centuries of time has abundantly
proven. And the opinion that they then gave to Elizabeth and her counselors is to-day an
established rule of the law of nations against which no responsible Power would dare
protest, much less act."). See also Thomas Erskine Holland, An Inaugural Lecture on
Albericus Gentilis delivered at All Souls College, November 7, 1874, in 14-15 AN
INAUGURAL LECTURE ON ALBERICUS GENTILIS (Macmillan

and Co.,

London

1874)

(1874). For a more in-depth discussion of Gentili's opinion on the Mendoza affair and
his subsequent development of the doctrine of the rights and duties of ambassadors, see
generally GENTILI, DE LEGATIONIBUS LIBRI TRES supra note 7.
30. VAN DER MOLEN, supra note 14, at 50.

31.

Id. at 49.

In the summer of 1586, Gentili left England for a period, traveling to
Wittenburg, Germany where he served as advisor to Horatius Pallavicinus,
ambassador of Queen Elizabeth to the Elector of Saxony. 32 Gentili's
stay at Wittenburg was not a long one, however, and in late 1586 he was
recalled to England and appointed Regius Professor of Civil Law at
Oxford. Once re-established at Oxford, Gentili devoted himself to writing
on the political questions of the day.33 The first of these, and that which
became the work for which Gentili is best known, concerned the laws of
war.
In 1588, three years after the Mendoza affair, Gentili published the
first part of his work on the laws of war. This was followed in 1589 by
parts two and three. Together the three books form Gentili's most famous
work, De Jure Belli Libri Tres3 4 ('Three Books on the Laws of War').
The three books of the Jure Belli deal with the three parts of warfare and
stem from debates occurring in England after the attempted arrival of the
Spanish Armada. 35 The first part discussesjus ad bellum, the legality of
going to war, including discussions of who has the authority to take a
state to war and what motivations are sufficient justifications. The
second part of the book focuses on jus in bello, focusing on lawful
conduct during wartime. The third part discusses the conclusion of war
and the rights and obligations of both the victors and conquered. As will
be discussed in detail in Part III, this work contains a number of new
ideas, put forth by Gentili based, not only on his extensive understanding
of the history of law and the practice of states in warfare, but also on the
changing realities of his time.
In 1600 Gentili was elected a member of Gray's Inn, one of the four
royal Inns of Court and effectively left his teaching duties, although he
remained Regius Professor at Oxford.
In 1605, with the consent of
King James I, he was appointed as counsel to the Spanish Embassy in
London, a position for which he appeared on behalf of the King of Spain

32. Id. at51.
33. Panizza, supra note 20, at 1-2 ("In questa posizione, definitivamente integrato
nella societA inglese, il Gentili servendosi dei moduli formali della giurisprudenza
partecip6 attivamente alle principali controversie politiche e religiose che animarono la
scena inglese nell'ultima fase del regno elisabettiano e nei primissimi anni del regno di
Giacomo I Stuart." [In this position (Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford), firmly
integrated into English society, Gentili served to formulate the model of law for the
principle political and religious controversies on the English scene during the reign of
Elisabeth I and the first years of the reign of King James I.].
34. Phillipson, supranote 12, at 14a.
35. Benedict Kingsbury, Gentili, Grotius, and the Extra-European World, in THE
LAW OF THE SEA: THE COMMON HERITAGE AND EMERGING CHALLENGES 39-60 (Harry
Scheiber, ed. 2000) [hereinafter Kingsbury, Gentili].
36. VAN DER MOLEN, supra note 14, at 57.
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before the English Court of Admiralty. 37 This work led to the publication,
posthumously, of his third major work, entitled HispanicaeAdvocationis
Libri Duo ('Two Books of the Pleas of a Spanish Advocate') in 1613.
This work encompassed Gentili's thoughts on the rights of belligerents
and neutrals in wartime, reflecting Gentili's position as Spanish advocate
to England during a period of war between Spain and the Netherlands,
with a neutral England.38
Gentili's three principle works solidify his reputation as one of the
founders of the modern science of international law. 39 All of them
were written in order to provide answers to some of the most pressing
political questions of the day concerning England's relations with the
other European powers and the extra-European world.4 ° In addition to
these three principle works of international law and foreign affairs,
Gentili composed a body of smaller work including discourses on
questions of the time such as the extent of royal power, the union of
Scotland and England, and British constitutionalism, as well as historical
discourses on Roman law and discussions of contemporary issues such
as the theater and poetry. 4'
Alberico Gentili's works were composed in a style that set them apart
from previous works on international legal topics, such as those by the
Spanish theologians.4 2 Gentili wrote with a historical bent, but, as is

37.

Id. at 58.

38. Balch, supra note 13, at 671. See generally ALBERICO GENTILI, HISPANICAE
ADVOCATIONis LIBRi Duo (Frank Frost Abbott trans., Carnegie Classics 1921) (1661)
[hereinafter HISPANICAE ADVOCATIONIS]. In HISPANICAE ADVOCATIONIS Gentili argued
for Spain against the Dutch position that it could capture Spanish warships in English
waters. Gentili appealed to historical precedent and the application of Roman law, and
provided not only a statement of the doctrine of territorial sovereignty as a fundamental
principle of the laws between nations, but also the concept of an exclusive jurisdiction
for nations of their adjacent seas.
39. Balch, supra note 13, at 671.
40. Id. ("The... works upon which Albericus Gentili's fame as an international
jurist rests, and his title to be considered as one of the founders of the science of
international law, were all the result of the pressing questions of the say growing out of
the relations of England with other European Powers.").
41. Benedict Kingsbury, Confronting Difference: The Puzzling Durability of
Gentili 's Combination of PragmaticPluralismand Normative Judgment, 92 AM. J. INT'L
L. 713, 714 (1998) [hereinafter Kingsbury, Confronting Difference].
42. For a discussion on the works of the Spanish theologians, including Vitoria,
Sepulveda, and Las Cases, see generally LEWIS HANKE, THE SPANISH STRUGGLE FOR
JUSTICE IN THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA (1st Southern Methodist University Press 2002)
(1949); Joachim Von Elbe, The Evolution of the Concept of Just War in International
Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 665, 669-76 (1939); RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND

characteristic of the Renaissance, a historical bent focused on the writings
43
of the Greeks and the Romans, rather than the writings of scripture.
Prior to Gentili, writers on international law topics had much in common.
They were for the most part Catholic, from either Spain or Italy. They
were theologians as well as lawyers. They drew the basis for their arguments
from the Bible as interpreted by St. Augustine, with some basis in the
works of Aquinas. They make little reference to the secular tradition,
nor to each other's work. 44 Gentili, on the other hand, was not a theologian,
but rather a lawyer first, and then a scholar and diplomatic representative.
Gentili used religious texts very infrequently in his writings, but he did
cite extensively a wide variety of other literature, both ancient and
modem texts, comfortably referring to his contemporaries as well as the
classic canonical writers such as Aristotle, Cicero, and Livy. Moreover,
Gentili used both ancient and modem examples to demonstrate his
points.
Alberico Gentili died in England on June 19, 1608, leaving behind a
substantial body of work. This work was influential on subsequent legal
scholars, most particularly on the Dutchman Hugo Grotius, who, in 1625
published his own tome on the laws of war and the relations between
states, several decades after Gentili.4 5 Despite this influence on other
legal scholars, however, Gentili's work did not, at least up until the late
nineteenth century, receive the widespread treatment of that of Grotius
or subsequent scholars such as Pufendorf, Vattel, and Kant. More recent
times, however, have seen an increase in interest in Gentili's work and
recognition of his place as the first modem international legal scholar.
Beginning with the efforts of Thomas Erskine Holland at Oxford, reexamination of Gentili's work has begun, predominantly in Europe. As
this paper suggests, events since the end of the twentieth century suggest
an even greater relevance for Gentili's work on international law.46

PEACE: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROT1US TO KANT

51-78 (1999).
43. Holland, supra note 29, at 57-58
44. Id. at 51.
45. Grotius himself recognized his debt to Gentili's work. See HUGO GROTIUS,
THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 110 (Richard Tuck, ed., Liberty Fund 2005) (1625)
("[A]lbericus Gentilis, whose labour, as I know it may be serviceable to others, and
confess it has been to me ... ").
46. There has indeed been increased activity among the scholarly community in
addressing Gentili's work in recent years. Largely this is due to the efforts of the Centro
Internazionale di Studi Gentiliani in San Gensio, Italy. The CISG sponsors a number of
seminars and colloquia for both university students and scholars to address Gentili's
work in both a modem and historical context. These events attract scholar from around
the globe. See http://www.cisg.it (for a discussion of the conventions the center has
organized that have been attended by prominent Italian academics, click on "Convegni
Giornate Gentiliane").
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III. GENTILI'S CONTEXT: THE RENAISSANCE WORLD-FROM
BARBARISM TO LAW

Gentili's life (1552-1608) corresponded with the period of the late
Renaissance in Italy and the High Renaissance in England. This was a
period of rapid change, not only in Europe, but around the globe. 47 Few
facets of life remained untouched by political, religious, economic, and
social developments which not only affected people directly through
new forms of government and expanding international trade, but also
indirectly through the changing nature of foreign relations, new concepts
of power and sovereignty, and the discovery of new civilizations which
brought into question both what it means to be part of the human race,
and the justness of certain existing doctrine. Some specific questions
with which Gentili dealt during his tenure at Oxford included: the extent
of royal power; the union of Scotland and England; the rights of
belligerents and neutrals in time of war; the power of the Pope and the
relationship between the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor; the authority
of the sovereigns; war in the name of religion; global commerce, naval
warfare and the freedom of the high seas; religious tolerance; the right of
states to deal with those operating outside the law, such as pirates and
brigands; and the rights of the natives of the New World.4 8 All of these
questions had potentially profound consequences for the stability of the
49
international system.
Many at the time believed that there was no
possibility of a common body of international law that could address
these varying issues and the various positions maintained by states. The
possibility of war was a constant factor as states began to regard law as
an impossibility and began to advocate the freedom of states to act
purely based on their interests.5 °
47. PAUL JOHNSON, THE RENAISSANCE: A SHORT HISTORY 3 (2002) ("[Tlhe period
of transition between the medieval epoch, when Europe was 'Christendom,' and the
beginning of the modem age.").
48. Balch, supra note 13, at 671; Phillipson, supra note 12, at 15a- I6a.
49. Since I am focusing on Gentili and his environment in this paper, the international
system essentially means the regions we would classify today as Western and Eastern
Europe, the Balkans, Turkey, North Africa and the states surrounding the Mediterranean.
Certainly in this same period there were other equally evolved civilizations around the
globe, such as those in the Americas and Asia, however, for purposes of discussing the
law of nations at the time in which he wrote, Gentili did not focus on these as they were
not an everyday part of European affairs.
50. Advocates of this position included the Spaniard Sepulveda who argued that
the Spanish were justified in their conquest of the New World and their treatment of
natives, and there was no international law that could say otherwise. Among this group

Gentili, on the other hand, not only writing but actively participating
in the ensuing debates over many of these issues was in a perfect position
from which to compose a new framework of international rules to assist
with the changing global system. Rather than subscribing to a fatalist
position of international law, Gentili's principle works focus on a number of
the most divisive concerns in international law and international relations at
the time and discuss ways in which the existing law of nations can
provide guidance for each of the problems provided one understands that
international law is not absolute and that adaptations must be made to
reconcile differing positions and situations. In no way, however, did Gentili
advocate the refutation of international law. Instead, his approach revitalized
international law and led to its continued development throughout the
17th century.51
There are five principle contextual transitions occurring at the turn of
the 17th century which are important for understanding both the difficulty
faced by Gentili in promoting respect for international law, and
understanding why the lessons of this period can bolster support for
international law today. These are shifting understandings of state sovereignty,
the balancing of power, the changing notions of military power, the
expansion of global commerce, and the rise of extra-legal actors. Each
of these are described briefly below, before turning to a discussion of
Gentili's more specific contributions to international law.
A. The Shifting Notions of Sovereignty
Perhaps the single biggest issue for debate in international law during
Gentili's time was the concept of state sovereignty, and what different
understandings of sovereignty meant for states' rights and obligations
towards other states and peoples. 52 At the end of the 16th century, the
nations of Europe were still in the beginning stages of forming into the
general geographic patterns that we recognize today. In those states that
were also the members of the English government who argued that the Spanish
Ambassador Mendoza could be tried and punished in England, and the various nations
that advocated no common rule guiding behavior on the seas or in terms of international
commerce, that it was rather a free-for-all. See generally Balch, supra note 13;
Phillipson, supra note 12.
51. One of the highlights of this period, of course, was the signing of the Peace
of Westphalia in 1648. While ending the Thirty Years' War the peace treaty also
specifically recognized choice in religion and the sovereignty of states in an international
treaty. For the text of the treaty, see Yale University's Avalon Project, http://www.
yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/westphal.htm.
52. Holland, supra note 29, at 29. The recognition and development of rules by
which the intercourse of States might be governed was rendered necessary at the close of
the middle ages by the discovery of new portions of the globe, and by the emancipation
of the several States of Europe from the tutelage of the Pope and the Emperor.
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were relatively unified, such as France, Spain, the Netherlands, and England,
numerous concerns remained over what power states possessed and
could exercise over their own subjects, in relation to other states, and around
the globe. These more powerful states frequently approached international
law as non-existent, recognizing a minimum number of historic laws
stemming from the Roman law of nations centered on notions of the just
war.
The dominant approach, however, ignored any understanding of international
law governing state relations relevant to the new circumstances of the
global system. States with imperialistic regimes argued against the existence
of territorial sovereignty. Foreign cultures were seen as unprotected by
the natural law that applied across Europe through the Middle Ages.
Expansion in trade was viewed as a potential free-for-all, with each
capable nation using common resources as they saw fit, regardless of the
effect on others. In other words, the powerful states refuted the authority
and even the relevance of international legal principles because they
were viewed as interfering with ambitions and interests of those states.
At the same time, however, states viewed their rights of action within
their own borders and towards their own citizens as absolute. No
outside interference could govern such actions, and no international law
could bind them to any standards of behavior.
Much of the impetus behind the new debates over state sovereignty
and its attendant rights and obligations was the result of the shift in the
power of the Catholic Church from religious and secular power to
primarily being a religious authority, and from being the sole Christian
religion to being one of several options. These changes had profound
consequences, not only for relationship between the European states, but
also for the internal structures of the states themselves, as well as the
relationship of the Christian Europeans to the rest of the world.
Throughout the Middle Ages, the Catholic Church was a central
power in much of Europe. With the decline and eventual demise of the
Roman Empire in the 5th and 6th centuries, many regions in Europe fell
into disarray due to the lack of centralized authority.5 3 The Church
stepped in to fill this gap, providing political as well as spiritual support
throughout most of central and southern Europe. 54 Throughout this
53.
MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS: TEXT, MATERIALS
AND CASES ON THE CIVIL AND COMMON LAW TRADITIONS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
FRENCH, GERMAN, ENGLISH AND EUROPEAN LAW 22-23 (2d ed. 1994).

54.

Id.

period, the Church gained wealth and secular power in addition to
increasing its number of followers. By the beginning of the period
called the Renaissance in Italy in the mid-15th century, the Catholic
Church, centered at the Vatican in Rome, was arguably the wealthiest
and most powerful political entity in the world."
With this power, however, came corruption, jealousy and fear, and by
the time of Gentili's birth in 1552, the dominance of the Catholic Church
had begun to crumble. 6 Through marriage and alliances, the sovereigns
of France, Spain, and Portugal began to consolidate their wealth and
57
power, often in direct opposition to the wishes of the Catholic Church.
Moreover, Italy-the stronghold of the Vatican and the home of the
Papal States-began to not only see revolt from within against the
authority of the Church, but also to suffer incursion from outside as
France, Spain, and the Germanic tribes began to invade the Italian territory
to refute the Pope's power and solidify their own.58
This shift in power, however, was not solely the result of powerful
kings. Many of the people of these territories were equally weary of the
corruption of the Church, and a backlash against the temporal power and
wealth of the Church began to spread.5 9 At the same time, national
allegiances began to form and solidify as it became a matter of "us"
against "them"-the French versus the Spanish, the Spanish versus the
Neapolitans, and the Pope versus the Holy Roman Emperor. The physical
unification of territories, coupled with the unifying sentiment of opposing
the Church or one's neighbors began to create for the first time feelings
of nationalism, which further reinforced the central authority of the
sovereigns in each of these territories, and diminished the power position
of the Church.6 °
Largely as a consequence of the loss of its secular power through a
backlash to Church corruption and abuse, the 16th century also saw a
rise in alternative forms of belief. Beginning with Martin Luther in
1517, the rise of alternative religious sects to balance the absolute
authority of the Catholic Church contributed to the reduction of power of
55. For one of the best contemporary discussions of the position of the Catholic
Church at the beginning of the Renaissance, see NICCOL6 MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE
(Harvey C. Mansfield ed., The University of Chicago Press, 2d ed. 1998) (1532).
56. NORMAN DAVIES, EUROPE: A HISTORY 471 (1996).
57.

EMIL LUCKI, HISTORY OF THE RENAISSANCE: BOOK V-POLITICS AND POLMCAL

THEORY 113 et seq. (1964).
58.

MACHIAVELLI, supra note 55.

59. DAVIES, supranote 56, at 484.
60. A similar national unification took place in England earlier than on the
continent due in part to a strongly centralized political and legal system put in place after
the arrival of William the Conqueror in 1066 and reinforced through England's geographic
isolation and early distance from the Catholic Church. See generally, GLENDON, et al.,
supra note 53, at 439-41.
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the Church. 61 As a result, however, the Vatican began to fight back,
instituting the Inquisition to root out those who opposed the Church's
teachings, and by relation the Church's power.62 This resulted in not only
the direct Inquisition, conducted predominantly in Spain and Italy by
authorities of the Church itself, but also in the wars of religion, pitting
supporters of the Catholic Church against new Protestant groups, and in
some cases, alternative Catholic sects.63
While in many ways, the wars of religion were another death-knell for
the secular power of the Church as they drove people farther away from
the Church, the primary damage they inflicted was within states themselves.
In those countries split between Catholic and non-Catholic groups,
simmering religious tensions often boiled over into political turmoil and
killings, such as the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre in France in 1572
where hundreds of Calvinist Protestants (the Huguenots) were killed by
a Catholic mob.64 These conflicts divided towns, cities, and countries, and
resulted in several hundred years of ongoing conflict ultimately leading
to the key founding document outlining the principle of state sovereignty,
the Treaty of Westphalia.
In addition to the internal and external strife occurring within Europe
as a result of the shift in state power, religious power, and notions of
sovereignty, the discovery of the Americas in the late 15th century also
had profound consequences for the European nations and their politics.
The discovery of entirely new cultures, with customs vastly different
from any the Europeans had seen before, created a number of disputes
over the rights and obligations the European states had towards these
new peoples. 65 At the heart of these debates was the question of religion,
and what the Catholic doctrine said about how to deal with these new
cultures. Fierce debates arose over whether the American Indians should be
conquered or left alone, should they be converted through force or
persuasion, were they even human-rational, with a soul--or were they
barbarians.66 Depending on one's interpretation of scripture and the
ancient philosophers, one's answer would differ widely. But what was
61.
62.

DAVIES, supra note 56, at 484-85.
Id. at 496-97, 502-07.

63.

Id.

64. Id. at 496, 502.
65. See generally HANKE, supra note 42, for a discussion of these disputes.
66. Id. (Clearly the peoples living in the New World maintained authority over
their land, and the tribal leaders authority over their people, in a manner similar to the
sovereign states of Europe.).

at the heart of this debate was, once again, a tension between the traditional
authority of the Church and the emerging notions of sovereignty centered
on the new nation-state.6 7
Each of these events precipitated a shift in understandings of sovereignty
and of state rights and obligations, both domestically and internationally.
As the power of the Church diminished, individual states moved to fill
the void, solidifying their power internally while at the same time seeking to
assert their power abroad. Concurrently, however, these same notions of
sovereignty were brought under scrutiny through the discovery of
new civilizations, seemingly sovereign in their own right, but so vastly
different from the European norm as to further entrench the debate over
what rights and obligations were required of sovereign states towards
others.
B. The Balancingof Power
The changes in the authority of the Church, the rise of nationalism,
and the debates of the meaning and application of the concept of sovereignty
also led to shifts in the power balance of Europe. States formerly not
considered powers, such as France and the German states, through continued
consolidation and increases in power began to assert themselves more in
European affairs. At the same time, traditional powers such as the Church,
the Kingdom of Naples, Spain and Portugal, began to see their prior
dominance threatened by the rise in these new powers.68 The tension
was particularly acute between France and Spain to determine who
would most likely fill the power void on the continent as the authority of
the Church declined, and in the Americas as new discoveries were made.
Additionally, smaller countries, such as the Netherlands and England
were rapidly increasing their relative power positions through the development
of international commerce and new military and naval technology.
More important for purposes of peace and stability, however, was the
fact that the disputes among the Western European states allowed nonEuropean entities to achieve a substantial rise in their own individual
power, as well as an increase in their power positions vis-A-vis the

67. These questions stirred many debates in the 16th and 17th century, particularly
in Spain and France, where they were captured in the works of a number of the most
prominent political thinkers of the day. In Spain, the best example of this debate can be
seen in the debate which took place between Sepulveda and Las Casas at Valladolid in
1550. Id. at 114-15. In France, these questions were taken up by Montaigne, who
discussed them in a number of his ESSAIES, most notably On Cannibals. See MICHEL DE
MONTAIGNE, THE COMPLETE ESSAYS (M.A. Screech ed., Penguin Books 1991).
68. See DAVIES, supra note 56, at 529-34.

69.

310

Id. at 534-39, 545-53.
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Western states.7 0 For example, beginning in the latter part of the 14th
century there was an ascendance of Slavic power, facilitated by the
ongoing in-fighting within Christian Europe. 7 1 This is in addition to the
substantial power of the Turks, and their ongoing expansion in the Middle
East and around the eastern Mediterranean. 72 By the mid-15th century
in fact, the Turks began to penetrate into Europe, advancing as far as
Vienna in 1529. 3 This created great insecurity in the Europe of Gentili's
day; an insecurity that brought into question the viability of international
law and calls by some to abandon international rules in favor of freedom
of action to counter these rising threats.
C. The ChangingNature of Military Action
In addition to the political, philosophical, and geographic shifts occurring
in Europe and elsewhere during the 16th and 17th centuries, more tangible
changes were also taking place in technological development and professional
areas such as soldiering, banking, and trade. These developments further
contributed to feelings of instability, as new and more advanced technologies
and modes of transportation made the world seem smaller and more
interconnected. This, in turn, made existing rules in areas such as war and
commerce seem obsolete. The perceived decline of the old rules seemed
beneficial in the case of economic development and trade, but had potentially
adverse consequences in terms of increased opportunity for loss of power or
wealth. Consequently, this development contributed to the overall unsettled
nature of the period.
An example may be seen in the new military tactics and technologies
being developed which made the old rules of warfare obsolete.7 4 These
changes included the rise of large infantries (as opposed to cavalries) as
the main fighting force; the advancement of weaponry, including the
pistol, the rifle and the canon; and the change in combat strategy from a
straight-forward frontal assault to tactical deployment of troops.75 Moreover,
advancements in ship-building technology allowed for the increase in

70. Id. at 558-60.
71.
On the rise in power of the Balkan states, see LUCKI, supra note 57, at 29-31,
52 ("[B]y 1350 Serbia became the greatest power in the Balkans and thereby contributed

to the shift of the center of gravity of political power to central Europe.").
72. Id. at 64-65.
73. VAN DER MOLEN, supra note 14, at 7.
74. DAVIES, supra note 56, at 518-20.
75. LUCKI, supra note 57, at 105-09.

naval power and thus the ability to fight a battle at seas as well as an as
well as one on land. For ocean-going states such as England, the Netherlands,
and Spain this was extremely important and greatly increased their
power potential. For states such as France, Germany, and Italy which did
not possess equal naval strength, this brought an increased sense of
unease. Moreover, these new developments brought into question traditional
rules about warfare, which prior to this period had been some of the
longest-standing rules of international law. This uncertainty further
contributed to the belief that perhaps international law was not capable
of addressing the rapid developments in technology and warfare that
contributed to the unsettled nature of the international system.
D. The Expansion of Global Commerce
The same advancements which increased the scope of navies also
increased the possibility of overseas commerce, as stronger and faster
ships meant greater distances could be traveled to trade and products
would be shipped much faster. This thus led to an expansion of trade
both within and outside of Europe.76 This increase in trade had a number of
effects. First, the increase in trade also resulted in a corresponding increase
in related areas, such as banking and insurance, causing growth in these
industries on an rapidly increasing scale and contributing to the development
of such industries in states where they previously did not exist. 77 This
increased the wealth of states, contributing to the shifts in state power
which were causing instability in the international system. Second, the
overall economic expansion that was facilitated by the increased trade
and development related industries also led to a corresponding shift in
the internal economic structures of a number of European states. This
was characterized by a shift from feudal economies to more marketoriented economies, which in turn contributed to the general economic
development of these states and subsequently strengthened their overall
power position. As international legal rules governing trade and commerce
had been limited prior to the 17th century given the difficulties of longdistance trade and the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few, the
new merchants, bankers, traders, and their supportive sovereigns felt that
international law would be ill-equipped to address their growing needs.

76. JOHNSON, supra note 47, at 15 ("With revolutionized sea power and improved
land transport, internal and external trade in Europe virtually doubles with each
generation.").
77. Id.

[VOL. 8: 291, 2007]

Can InternationalLaw Survive?
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.

E. The Rise of Extra-Legal Actors
With the change and uncertainty occurring in the 17th century, there
was also an increase in the number of individuals who sought to take
advantage of unstable and vulnerable situations. The increase in number
of seagoing vessels involved in trade and transport, coupled with the
inadequate resources given to protect merchant ships due to the other
pressing security and political situations resulting from concerns over
the balance of power, made these vessels rather vulnerable. This led to
an increase in piracy both within European waters and along trade routes,
particularly those between the Americas and the Iberian Peninsula, as the
ships were often filled with gold, silver, and precious metals.78 These
pirate groups were a new and increasingly dangerous force to be
reckoned with as they observed no existing laws and did not appear to
fear the consequences of their actions.79
Corresponding to the increase in piracy on the seas, there was an
increase in brigandage on land. Given the numbers of internal and
external conflicts occupying the attention of the major European states,
many smaller territories and outlying areas were left unprotected, and
thus subject to the invasion of brigands, who like pirates observed no
recognized form of law or civility and created tremendous destruction,
and frequently death, in their wake. As the newly centralized European
states were focusing their attention of competing with each other,
however, questions over how best to tackle this common threat were left
unaddressed. Moreover, even should they be addressed, the question
remained as to whether international law could even take up the problem.
While, of course, there were other changes taking place during Gentili's
lifetime, these are the most relevant for the questions posed at the time
concerning the viability of international law. Moreover, in these five
major shifts of the 16th and 17th centuries, we can see reflections of the
tensions at the root of the debates over international law today. Indeed,
questions of state sovereignty persist, visible in the recent debates over

78.

See, ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 20 (Transnational Publishers

2d

ed.) (1998) ("In the 16th century ...the sea was filled with pirates, and pirates perhaps
even more cruel than those of earlier days. Commerce raiding ... takes a mask,
disguises itself as semi-official warfare ... " quoting French historian Fernand Braudel).
79. See id.at 21 ("[T]he picture is... one of lively and dangerous commerce and
conflicting claims to authority that might be called an authority to tax nearby shipping
lanes with capture of the vessel, confiscation of its cargo, and the enslavement of the
crew .... ).

the legality of anticipatory intervention in Iraq and humanitarian intervention
in the Balkans and in Africa. Moreover, sovereignty questions arise in
terms of the ever-expanding human rights, environmental, criminal, and
economic regimes: can international law dictate the behavior of states
within their own borders? With the rise of radical Islam as well as the
moral overtones adopted in the rhetoric of the Bush administration,
questions have resurfaced over whether law and religion can ever go
together. With the end of the Cold War, the United States is now the
world's only superpower. Many have asked whether international law
can survive in such a hegemonic system, particularly when the hegemon
seems indifferent-if not downright hostile-to international law.
Finally, whereas Gentili had brigands and pirates, today we have terrorists.
Since the international community has yet to agree on a definition of
terrorism, critics of international law argue that it is unlikely international
law will ever serve to stop terrorist activity, and therefore is irrelevant.
Given the reflection of the debates of the turn of the 17th century with
those at the turn of the 21st century, a renewed examination of Gentili's
vision of international law to address these tensions is relevant today.
How Gentili dealt with such significant change and turmoil while at the
same time maintaining his belief in international law as the best hope for
the international system may serve to silence modern critics with the
same rational approach used by Gentili 400 years ago.
IV. GENTILI'S WORK: MODERN THINKING FOR CHANGING TIMES

Gentili was not the first to write about international law. It had been
done for hundreds, if not thousands, of years at the time Gentili began
his work. However, only in the century or two prior to Gentili had any
official compilations of laws of nations been written down, and none so
thorough as that which Gentili produced during his tenure at Oxford.8 °
During the 13th to 15th centuries theologians and scholars associated
with the Catholic Church began to consider the importance of international
law, particularly in relation to the notion of the just war. From Aquinas
through Vitoria and Suarez, the Catholic scholars outlined rudimentary
concepts of a law of nations based fundamentally on interpretations of
scripture. Their efforts, however, were primarily limited to those questions
which involved the Church and its activities, and thus were not suitable
for the rise of a system of nation-states separate from the authority of the
Church. The changes occurring during the 16th and early 17th centuries,
80. Holland, supra note 29, at 41 ("It must of course be admitted that the idea of a
law of nations in general, and a law of war in particular, had been growing gradually, as
all ideas grow; but Gentili marked an epoch in the history of those ideas, and launched
the study on a new course of progress.").
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as outlined in the preceding section, called for greater depth in the
structure of an international legal framework that which Catholic doctrine
could provide. Moreover, as described above, questions abounded as to
whether a body of international law in the post-Church dominated world
would still be useful, or even possible. Gentili's work addresses these
concerns with ten key tenets that he considered essential for the success
of a body of international law. He drew from his personal experience to
highlight the logic of his position, and provided concrete examples by
which states could follow his recommendations.
Like many scholars at the time, Gentili was more than just a writer.
Gentili was also an educator and a statesman, called on by Queen
Elizabeth I to both advise her government on questions of international
law and diplomacy and to analyze specific problems and represent
England's interests abroad.8 ' His stature was such that Gentili was also
asked to represent foreign governments in England, the most prominent
example being 82
his representation of the Spanish government before the
English courts.
Therefore, much of Gentili's work was based, not on
the theoretical, as was the case with many of predecessors, but on the
practical; in other words, he wrote in direct response to incidents that
occurred around him,8 3 and addressed the most relevant questions of his
day. This use of modern examples allowed Gentili's work to be a more
practical guide to the rulers of his day, and provided a concrete basis on
which states could rely to form the core of a law of nations.
A. Gentili's Top Ten Tenetsfor Useful InternatinalLaw
Culled from Gentili's primary works, the De Jure Belli in particular,
there are ten principal contributions he made which I suggest highlight
his efforts to demonstrate that international law is relevant and is a better
alternative than a world of all against all without any legal guidelines.
Each of the ten principles are highlighted below. Some are more
procedural, highlighting the 'modernity' of Gentili and his break with
the law of nations of the past. Others are more substantive in nature,
focused on the importance of international law for addressing some of
those questions that Gentili felt were particularly important for the

81. Kingsbury, Confronting Differences, supra note 41, at 719
realistic and pragmatic sense of the recurrent features of politics.").
82. See Part II of this paper.
83.

(Gentili has a

ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 94 (1954).

international community to address. Each, however, comprises a component
of his broader approach to addressing critics of international law and
underlying how an international system based on law, rather than a
lawless world, will in the end prove much more prosperous and
peaceful, even in light of the significant changes in the global system at
the time.
1. InternationalLaw is Not NationalLaw
Prior to Gentili, scholars and writers on the nascent law of nations
focused on this law as an extension of the existing civil or religious laws.
This view stemmed from the University of Bologna, where the glossators
and post-glossators focused on codifying the codes of Justinian for
contemporary usage, including Roman conceptions of the law of
nations, into one body of law. Gentili saw this as the first fundamental
problem with the development of "modem" international law.85 Although
well versed in Roman Law, and even a great contributor to the revival of
the study of Roman law at Oxford while a Professor there, Gentili
believed that internationallaw-the law by, for, and between stateswas fundamentally different from laws governing people within states.86
In order to have a successful international legal regime, an understanding
of this difference was crucial.
Gentili points out that the community to whom civil law is addressed
is a community brought together under one sovereign authority.
International society, however, in contrast to the domestic community, is
a society where "the rights and obligations of its component members
cannot be determined by mere reference to provisions of the civil law or
other municipal law. ",87 Rather the rights and obligations of states must
be discussed under a new framework, one which recognizes the lack of a
centralized authority to monitor and punish, but which also recognizes
that the force of international law comes from the participation of all; the
force of the group. This is not to say, however, that there is no mention
of civil law principles in the law of nations as posited by Gentili.

84. GLENDON ET AL., supra note 53, at 48-49. Gentili criticizes this effort. See
GENTILI, DE LEGATIONIBUS LIBRI TREs, supra note 7, at 4 (where he highlights that fact
that Justinian himself did not seek to incorporate the law of nations into the civil law:
"[O]ur own Justinian, who made laws for his countrymen, did not go beyond the
boundaries of the state which he desired to furnish with those laws.").
85. GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI, supra note 4, at 4 ("[E]arlier interpreters have gone
astray in introducing into this subject a bald and often inappropriate study of civil law.").
86. Id. at 3 ("For this form of law [law of nations] is not assembled and given
expression in the books of Justinian ... those books do not discuss that variety of law,
nor do any other in existence.").
87. Phillipson, supranote 12, at 20a.
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Rather, he uses these principles as illustrative for his arguments focused
on a new system of international law, one focused on the sovereignty of
states and the unique relationships states have with one another (in
contrast to the relationship individuals have within their states or with
their states). In this way, Gentili begins his discussion of international
law from a fundamentally different position than many who came before
and opened up the possibility for a new understanding of international
law; one better suited to the realities of the international system.
2. Religion and Law Do Not Mix
By separating international law from civil law, Gentili was subsequently
able to achieve what was perhaps the most important of his tenets
concerning international law: the separation of religion from the law of
nations. As discussed above, during Gentili's lifetime there was a general
move away from the inclusion of religion in politics and law, and the
power of the Catholic Church had significantly diminished in favor of
national power and religious diversity. Religion, however, still played a
role in the domestic politics of individual states. By separating international
law from the domestic civil law, Gentili removed the incendiary component
of religion from the international legal structure, providing a level
playing field without the influence of religion.
By way of example, Gentili believed that it was neither the place of
the theologian nor the philosopher to speak of law between states; that
was something that should be left to the jurist.88 Gentili was thus
instrumental in separating the notions of religion from the development
of international law. 89 While Spanish scholars Vitoria and Las Casas
88. GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI, supra note 4, at 3. In fact, it does not appear to be the
function either of the moral or of the political philosopher to give an account of the laws
which we have in common with out enemies and with foreigners. For the moralist,
whether he treats of the private customs of individuals or aims at the highest good in
some other way, always confines himself within the city-state, and rather limits himself
to the foundations of the virtues than rears lofty structures. Neither is it the part of the
political philosopher to set forth the Law of War, since this relates, not to a single
community, but to all.
89. Gentili mentioned a number of times in his works his belief that religion and
the law should be separate from one another.

See NUSSBAUM, supra note 83, at 96 (

("Whereas Vitoria has told the jurists that his subject matter is not for them, Gentili,
discussing the question of war against the Turks, warns theologians 'to keep silent on
matters outside of their province."). Gentili's sentiment is in response to an earlier
statement by Vitoria, in which the Spaniard wrote that the inquiry into the rights of the
natives in the New World "is not for jurists only, because, since the savages are not

pushed the development of the law of nations forward, recognizing the
concept of sovereignty of nations and denouncing the barbarity of the
Spanish conquest of the New World, their teachings were still fundamentally
grounded in Catholic discourse. 90 Gentili, on the other hand, a survivor
of the religious persecution that ravaged the European continent during
the 16th century, believed that law and religion should be separate from
one another. His writings on international law reflect this belief, focusing
on the practicalities of diplomacy and the affairs of nations, rather than
the moral ideals as dictated by the Church.
While Gentili believed that religion had no place in law generally, and
international law in particular, 91 this is not to imply that he removed all
considerations of morality from the law. He did, in fact, take into account
certain beliefs about morality-or the "right" course of action-in his
discussions of international law, particularly pertaining to obligations
owed by states to their own nationals as well as other peoples. What he
did not engage in, however, was a subjection of modem law, particularly
the law designed to guide the behavior of states, to the tenets of religion.
This certainly stems in part from his own persecution at the hands of the
Catholic Inquisition in Italy prior to his escape to England, but it is also
a sign of the modernity of his thinking. Gentili's de-emphasis of religion as
a basis for law addressed the changing circumstances of the late 16th
century world in which he lived, and corresponded to his attempt to
provide practical legal guidance for the governments of Europe.
Gentili thus removed from his work the theological underpinnings
which were so common in that of his predecessors. He, instead, based
his work on historical examples and Roman law; not the Roman civil
law as outlined in Justinian's Code, but the Romanjus gentium, the law
designed to govern the wide and diverse Roman Empire.92 Gentili
subject to human law, their affairs are not to be tested by human, but rather by divine
law, in which the jurists are not sufficiently expert." For more on Vitoria, see Holland,
supra note 129, at 51.
90. See generally HANKE, supra note 42.
91. See supra notes 88-89.
92. GEORGE W. KEETON, SHAKESPEARE'S LEGAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND 69
(1967).
In origin, Roman law had been the exclusive law of a small agricultural
community, which proved unsuitable for application to the many varied types
of foreigner over whom the Romans came to rule, and whose activities
gradually transformed Rome into a great metropolis, to which great numbers of
foreigners resorted, especially for trade. Since it was impossible to apply to
these varied peoples the civil law (jus civile) of Rome, the Roman magistrates
and jurists gradually developed a special system of law applicable to them, into
which were incorporated those usages which appeared to be common to
foreigners in general, or to most of them. In commercial and maritime matters
especially there were common usages, based on a common approach to similar
problems. This law the Romans termed jus gentium.
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developed a method of writing based on the examination of actual
phenomenon, of the concrete facts, and then, through a process of induction
inferred the general rules of law.9 3 This is a very legalistic method of
inquiry and it is a method which had remained dominant today.94
Moreover, Gentili left room in his structure of international law for
future modifications, or even cancellation if necessary in light of newly
discovered facts.95 This ability to change with the times was absent from
the works of Gentili's predecessors, particularly the theologians; for
when you base your legal structure on the divine law, there is not room
for change because the divine law is eternal.
3. Diversity is Beneficial Not Harmful
At the time of Gentili's writing, the world had gone from essentially a
dichotomous position-an "us versus them" scenario--encompassing
the Christian world and the Islamic world to a pluralistic position which
included a diverse grouping of Christian faiths and a multitude of new
cultures never before encountered; all with beliefs and customs that in
many cases differed dramatically from those of the Europeans. One of the
key problems that Gentili wrestled with was how to create and maintain
an international system of rules for states to follow, while at the same
time addressing the increasing diversity of the international community
and preserving the freedom of belief.
Gentili's answer was to focus on those universals which could, or
should, be found across the globe, 96 such as respect for the sovereignty
Id. at 79.
[I]n the jus gentium there was discernable a body of principles which was
capable of regulating the intercourse of civilized states. This, he observes,
includes all those rational practices that have developed from the inherent
unity of mankind, which makes itself felt amid all the diversity of states and
peoples.

Id.

93. Phillipson, supra note 12, at 19a.
94. See Walter Mattli & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Constructing the European Community
Legal System from the Ground Up: The Role of Individual Litigants in National Courts,
6 Jean Monnet Work Papers Series (1996), available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.
org/papers/96/9606ind.html.
95.
Phillipson, supra note 12, at 19a.
96. GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI, supra note 4, at 8 ("[T]hey say that the law of nations
is that which is in use among all nations ... which nature has established among all
human beings, and which is equally observed by all mankind."). Gentili provides
clarification for this position as well, anticipating the counter-argument to his position:

of both the state and the individual, and the right of everyone to live a
secure and peaceful life. And while in his own time, he would continue
to maintain his own moral outlook regarding certain customs (his opposition
to cannibalism, for example), his approach to international law and his
strongly held belief that a law of nations was possible despite
these
97
differences forms the core of his international legal thought.
4. State Sovereignty Must be Respected
As highlighted above, during Gentili's lifetime a shift was occurring
in the basic understanding of sovereignty. Throughout the Middle Ages,
the concept of sovereignty literally referred to the sovereign kings and
queens of the various European territories, as well as the Pope in Rome
and the Holy Roman Emperor. 98 Beyond these few individuals, no one
person, group of peoples, or political entity was considered to possess
sovereignty. The consolidation of national territories, the revelation of
the widespread corruption within the Church, and the Reformation and
subsequent wars of religion all challenged the traditional conception of
sovereignty. Instead of an understanding focused on kings and queens
beholden to the Pope and Holy Roman Emperor, there emerged a new
view of the sovereignty of nation-states-free of the yoke of the Church
and powerful in their own right. 99 This shift in power and the new
This statement, however, must not be understood to mean that all nations
actually came together at a given time, and that thus the law of nations was
established. ... [lit is not necessary to understand the word omnes in such a
way that when one speaks of the usage of all nations it should be considered to
mean absolutely every nation; since countless numbers of these, in regions
widely separated from us, utterly different in their customs, and of different
tongues, remain unknown.... [T]hat which has successively seemed
acceptable to all men should be regarded as representing the intention and
purpose of the entire world.
Id.at 8 et seq.
97. For further discussion on Gentili's pluralist approach, see Kingsbury, supra
note 41.
98. DAVIES, supra note 56, at 479 ("In politics [during the Renaissance] gave emphasis
to the idea of the sovereign state as opposed to the community of Christendom, and
hence to the beginnings of modem nationality. The sovereign nation-state is the
collective counterpart of the autonomous human person.").
99. This, of course, culminated in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 in which it was
specifically stated that each Prince has the right to determine the internal policies of his
state. See Balch, supra note 13, at 667 for further discussion ("The impulsion towards
the formation of independent and sovereign nations such as constitute the members of
the family of nations to-day, received an immense impetus from the Reformation. That
great religious schism, in challenging the claim of the Papacy to universal sovereignty,
both in the temporal and the spiritual world, naturally resulted in the formation of
sovereignties that acknowledged no earthly superior. Consequently, it is not surprising
that one of the first publicists to cast off the bonds of the church as a universal superior
to which the publicists of the Middle Ages generally had subscribed, and to advocate a
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authority emerging from nation-based centers of power, rather than
regional or religious entities, called for a new set of rules on sovereignty
to protect the emergent states.
Gentili incorporated this protection into his body of international laws
in a number of ways. In addition to recognizing the sovereign authority
of states outright, Gentili formulated a detailed body of regulations designed
to guide states in their relations with one another in order to minimize the
likelihood that conflict would arise during the most general diplomatic
situations. Gentili recognized that permanent diplomatic corps and a
corresponding body of international laws concerning diplomacy, would
facilitate international relations and minimize the likelihood of one state
00
feeling as though its sovereignty has been infringed upon by another.
This push for rules of diplomacy to facilitate communication between
states was likely due to Gentili's own extensive experience with the
potential misunderstandings that can arise in the course of the everyday
relations among nations.
Gentili focused on the role of diplomats and diplomacy in international
law more than anyone who came before him. As mentioned above, his
entire first book dealt with the rights and obligations states maintain
towards ambassadors and overall diplomatic relations 0 1 In the centuries
prior to Gentili's Renaissance, the concept of diplomacy was extremely
limited. While the Ancient Greeks maintained rules about diplomacy
and the Romans expanded the concept further,' 0 2 by the time of the
Middle Ages, the business of diplomacy was generally handled on an ad
hoc basis, with no agreement among states as to the rules either the
diplomats themselves must follow, or that the states must follow towards
these representatives.) ° When a problem arose during this period, envoys
were dispatched to address it and they were discharged of their duties
upon completion; there was no formal diplomatic core.' 04 During Gentili's
time the system of the Middle Ages was found wanting, and replaced by
permanent representatives who not only handled problems when they

system of law in which the various members were treated as equal was a Protestant.").
On the Reformation generally, see HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 110-112 (John

Murray 1891) (1861).
100. Nys, supra note 7, at 22a (DE LEGATIONIBUS forms "the first systematic work
in this special field of the Law of Nations.").
101. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
102. GENTILI, DE LEGATIONIBUS, supra note 7, at 42, 5 1.
103. LUCK[, supra note 57, at 101.
104. Id.

arose, but could monitor all local events which might affect their countries.
The need for this was a consequence of the development of the nation-state
and was solidified during the 17th century in the Westphalian system.
Gentili responded to this need in his De Legationibus by codifying the
rule that he and Jean Hotman put forth in the Mendoza affair, and
elaborating on a system of rules of diplomacy designed to guide conduct
among states. Gentili touches on a wide number of subjects in relation
to ambassadors, embassies, and diplomacy in his work; all of which was
designed to further understanding of the importance of continuous, open
and communicative relations between states. Absent the creation of an
international organizational body, which Gentili did not advocate, having a
continuous supply of information on the activities of other states would
prevent misunderstanding and facilitate the opportunity10 5for negotiation,
a key component of Gentili's body of international law.
In addition to regulating diplomatic relations, Gentili also recognized
the importance of treaties in the increasingly multi-member international
community. In the Middle Ages, when the vast majority of territory was
either under control of the Church or nations too small and inconsequential
to major actors in the international system, formal agreements between
states were few. Should a disagreement arise between territories, the
Pope in Rome could arbitrate a solution to which both parties would be
bound. 0 6 With the diminishment of the power of the Church and the rise in
number of sovereign, independent states, each with their own interests, a
greater possibility for disagreement among various parties arose. Further,
given the improved power position of many of these states, a clear body
of treaty law, which would not only guide states in resolving their conflicts
but provide rules of assurance that such resolutions would
07 be upheld, could
greatly contribute to maintaining peaceful relations. 1
For example, in the Middle Ages treaties were commonly considered
binding only during the life of the rulers who entered into the agreement.
However, with the rise of the sovereign state in which the identity of the
state itself began to overtake that of individual rulers, the rules of the
Middle Ages no longer met the needs of international society. Gentili,
however, is generally guided by the notion that treaties are binding upon
the state in perpetuity, as an entity separate from that of the individual
rulers. 10 8 Gentili incorporates within this notion a number of understandings
that were new in his work, including the belief that a ruler defeated in
war cannot seek to annul a peace treaty under the argument that it was
105.
106.
107.
108.

GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI, supra note 4, at 16; Brownlie, infra note 142.
GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI, supra note 4, at 16.
NUSSBAUM, supra note 83, at 95.
Id.
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entered into by fear or duress. 10 9 This re-emphasizes Gentili's overall
conception of the just war in which he says that such an event may only
occur between sovereign states, not private individuals.
In the context of treaties, Gentili again seeks to remove any traces of
private law (i.e., civil law) by removing the private contractual conceptions
of fear and duress. Gentili also incorporates into his law of treaties the
understanding that, since treaties now last beyond the life of those who
made them, there must be an understanding among states that the
conditions upon which the treaty rests may change, and if this happens it
may require the treaty to be altered or annulled." 0 This allowed greater
flexibility to international law, and is one of the key additions Gentili
made to the work of the Spanish theologians that moved international
law into the modern era. International law must be definite in order for
it to be useful, but given that new developments and uncertainty are a
regular component of the international system, international law must
also be adaptable.
5. Sovereignty is Not Absolute
Gentili's conception of sovereignty, particularly as to its limits,
subsequently influenced a number of his other contributions to international
law. His understanding both of the developing nationalism corresponding
with the rise in absolute sovereignty of states based on national ties
rather than religion, and the necessary limits which much be placed on
this growing power in order to ensure peace and stability are useful
lessons.
While creating a body of international law that recognized the new
sovereign power of the state free from the domination of the Church,
Gentili was not beholden to the concept that sovereignty was absolute.
He not only advocated maintaining one's own state so as not to alarm
one's neighbors,' but also that actions by one state which caused fear
or harm in either another state or among a population of people, was
cause for action." 2 Gentili advocate the former of these positions in

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI, supra note 4, at 78. ("[W]e already know that
sovereignties are entitled to security and to a kind of unique bond of affection from a
neighbour (sic), and that these are lost when one's neighbors are changed.").
112. Id.

conjunction with his notion of the just war, in which he recognized that
action taken by one state which threatens another-even if the action did
not involve specific military action--can be cause for action in selfdefense. 1 3 In the case of the latter, Gentili was one of the first to recognize
that a state may be allowed to interfere with the absolute sovereignty
of another state if that state is harming either its own population or the
people of another state. 114
6. Those Who Operate Outside the Law Merit No
ProtectionFrom the Law
In addition to providing clear guidance to the protections and
limitations which attach to the new understanding of sovereignty in a
post-Middle Ages world, Gentili provided a set of related rules to guide
states in contending with a new set of actors in the international system:
brigands and pirates. As discussed above, with the increasein international
trade and the shifting balances of power, piracy and brigandage increased,
endangering many lives and resulting in the loss of much property and
economic value." 5 While such groups were present prior to Gentili's day,
their numbers and boldness increased such that they were becoming a
tremendous detriment to the developing economies of the new European
states. 116
Prior to Gentili's day, those such as pirates and brigands would likely
have been dealt with under the same laws of war that governed all
conflict. As warfare, pre-Gentili, was generally described as either a public
or private contest of arms, such rules could apply to rogue groups such
as pirates or brigands. In the absence of this, there existed very little
guidance as to how a state might handle such actors, and what forms of
punishment might be appropriate. Gentili, however, was very clear in
his guidance for state leaders on how to handle such people." 17 Gentili

It is not lawful to build fortresses in one's territories in order to cause fear to
those who are not one's subjects, as you will learn in the Third Book.
Accordingly, it is not lawful to do with one's own property something that
would cause fear to others, since it is said to be the same thing as to do it in
one's own territory and to one's own subjects.
113. GENTIi, DE JURE BELLI, supra note 4, at 58 (Gentili considers it "a defense
dictated by expediency, when we make war through fear that we may ourselves be
attacked" as, he argues, no state "is more quickly laid low than one who has no fear, and
a sense of security if the most common cause of disaster.").
114. GENTILI, DE JuRE BELLI, supra note 4, at 122.
115. See RUBn3N, supranote 78.
116. Id.
117.

GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI, supra note 4, at 41 ("[T]hose who separate themselves

from the rest of the body politic and arouse one part of the state against the other are
disturbers of the public peace, and an injury to the rest of the citizens.").

[VOL. 8: 291, 2007]

Can InternationalLaw Survive?
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.

emphatically states that brigands and pirates do not come under the
rights or obligations of the standard laws of war that apply between
states."18 Those who do not undertake to be part of the international
community, and abide by the law, are not then entitled to turn
9 around
and claim protections under that law when confronted with it."
Gentili, however, is very clear that there is a difference between those
who operate outside the law, such as brigands and pirates, and those
who, while operating contrary to the law, have not removed themselves
from civilized society to the extent where they are no longer protected
by the laws of nations. In making this distinction, Gentili recognizes
that in the modern world as it is emerging, not simply any entity will
2
0
meet the requirements of a sovereign state under international law.'
Sovereign states meet certain criteria, and it is the fulfillment of these
criteria which in turn determine whether such entities will be subject to
the rights and obligations of international law. Gentili defines those entitled
to the respect of the law of nations as those who have a geographic state
territory, a senate, a treasury, a united and harmonious citizenry, and the
authority to engage in negotiations for a peace treaty to end hostilities.'21
Those who do not meet this definition, such as pirates and brigands, are
not entitled to invoke the law of nations, and correspondingly, states22are
free to address problems with them as they feel will be most beneficial.

118.

Id.at22.

A state of war cannot exist with pirates and robbers.... For such men have
not through their misconduct emancipated themselves jurisdiction. One who is
a subject does not by rebellion free himself from subjection to the law ... and
that no one improves his legal status by transgression. . . . There is another
reason why such men do not come under the law of war; namely, because that
law is derived from the law of nations, and malefactors do not enjoy the
Pirates are the common enemies
privileges of a law to which they are foes ....
of all mankind....
119. Id. at23.
The question is not, what can be done with such men, or even what has usually
been done, but what must be done. To raise the dormer questions is to argue
on the basis of law, that is to say, the tie by which we are bound to our fellow
men; but we are not bound to brigands by any such tie.
120. Id. at 24.
[N]o one should understand me as speaking of other rebels than those who
were subject to authority. For those who have proved false to friendship, to a
treaty, or even to voluntary dependence, retain the rights of war and the other
privileges of the law of nations, as all history bears witness.
Id. at 25.
121.
122. Within the limits of universal conceptions of respect for human life. Gentili
does indicate that there are certain universal understandings-natural laws-which, because

7. War is Sometimes Necessary Within the Realm of Law

Of all the laws of nations, those concerning the circumstances under
which a state may engage in warfare are the most essential due the
profound consequences war may have both within states and in the
international system. Given this fundamental important of the laws of war,
it is certainly not surprising that Gentili is not the first to have written on
the laws of war. 23 Nor has he been the last. He was, however, a crucial
figure in the development of the laws of war.12 4 It was Gentili who shifted
the notions of just war firmly away from the religious foundations of the
Catholic Church.125 Prior to Gentili, Catholic theologians and Spanish
scholars such as Vitoria, Sepulveda, Las Casas and Suarez wrote about
the just war (and indeed argued with one other about its tenets) on the
basis of Catholic doctrine: it was just to go to war if the spreading of the
Catholic faith was in jeopardy. 126 Gentili, however, saw no place for

religion in the concept of modern warfare.
a. Defensive War
Gentili defines war as "a just and public contest of arms. "127 This
definition is unique for several reasons: one it removes from conceptions
of war conflicts that either occur between private individuals or between
private individuals and the state. 28 Gentili's definition is more precise

of their universal nature, must be respected by all towards all. See supra note 97 and
accompanying text; GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI, supra note 4, at 8.
123. For a brief history of the law of war, see Von Elbe, supra note 42.
124. A number of scholars have written on Gentili's book DE JURE BELLI LIBRI
TRES and the Italian's positions on the laws of war, summing up in there own words his
main contributions. One example comes from Professor Holland, probably the most
eminent of English Gentili scholars. See Holland, supra note 29, at 57-58
His achievement was threefold. He got rid of questions of tactics and of the
discipline of armies; he reduced to reasonable dimensions the topic of private
warfare; and he placed his subject upon a non-theological basis. It may
perhaps also be said that he avoided the error, subsequently committed by
Grotius, of endeavoring to force most of the topics of international law into the
framework of a treatise professedly on the Law of War.
125. Id. at 41 ("It must of course be admitted that the idea of a law of nations in
general and a law of war in particular, had been growing gradually, as all ideas grow; but
Gentili marked an epoch in the history of those ideas, and launched the study on a new
course of progress.").
126. Disagreement came with the timing of the war-whether it was just to simply
wage war outright in conjunction with the attempts at conversion, or whether one must
wait until rebuffed with armed force before resorting to arms.
127.

GENTrLI, DE JURE BELLI, supra note 4, at 12.

128. Id. at 15 ("[W]ar on both sides must be public and official and there must be
sovereigns on both sides ...").
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129
than many others, including the more widely cited definition of Grotius,
because he limits war to a contest between sovereign powers. This step
recognizes the changing nature of the international system to one focused
on sovereign states, and also stresses the notion of legality and regularity
as necessary components of war between sovereign powers. 30 Undertaking
a war against a private entity or a non-sovereign power falls outside the
realm of the law of nations. Undertaking a war against any states that
meet the definitions for sovereign statehood must, to be considered just,
abide by the laws of nations.
In addition to requiring war to be a just and public contest between
sovereigns, Gentili's formulation of the laws of war requires that war
must be necessary.' 31 Under his conception of necessity, the use of force
or resort to war on the basis of religion is unjust. 132 This is in stark
contrast to the view of just war that dominated the Middle Ages, primarily
based on the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas but elaborated on by the
Spanish theologians in the 14th and 15th centuries, in which expansion
of the Catholic religion was the most just reason to go to war.'33
Necessity implies that either a state's sovereignty or its people are in
immediate danger, and war is necessary to protect them. Engaging in
warfare for other reasons is not just.
Gentili does continue the tradition of specifying the primary reason to
engage in warfare, and one that is always just, is self-defense. This was
Gentili's basis for the legality of the continued warfare between
European states and the Turks. It wasn't religion, Gentili said, that was

129. Grotius defines war as "the State or Situation of those who dispute by Force of
Arms," and for Grotius this includes dispute between public or private entities. See
GROTIUS, supra note 45, at 134-35 ("Which general acceptance of the Word comprehends all

the kinds of War of which we shall hereafter treat, not even excluding single Combats,
which being really ancienter than Publick Wars, and undoubtedly of the same Nature,
may therefore well have one and the same Name."). Id.
130. Peter Haggemacher, Grotius and Gentili: A Reassessment of Thomas E.
Holland's Inaugural Lecture, in 167 HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

(Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, & Adam Roberts, eds., Clarendon Press 1992).
131.

GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI, supra note 4, at 20

[U]nless it is necessary, war cannot be just, since a just war is said to be
declared as the result of necessity. First there must be an appeal to a voluntary
compromise and to natural reasons, the arbitress of good and evil, as Seneca
calls her; also to other considerations, which have previously been noted.
Otherwise, he who tries to avoid a legal process distrusts the justice of his
cause.

132.
133.

GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI, supra note 4, at 38.
See Von Elbe, supra note 42.

at the root of the conflict, but the fact that the Turks were continuously
acting with aggression towards the European states. Having grown up in
the Marche region of Italy, near the Adriatic coast, Gentili had first hand
experience with the terror caused when it was believed the Turks were
about to invade. The continuous preparations by the Sultan for war, and
the hostile actions taken by the Turks towards the Europeans were
contrary to the laws of nations, and thus served as a just basis for war.
b. Anticipatory War
In addition to the basic structure of the laws of war which indicate
when a just basis for war is present, Gentili addresses the issue of anticipatory
war: when a state may be allowed to engage another in warfare prior to
an affirmative attack that meets the requirement of just cause. On the
issue of anticipatory war, Gentili has much to say. Gentili's general
formulation of anticipatory war is that a state against whom an enemy is
making preparations would be just in attacking that enemy. 134 The
question then becomes: when is this pre-emptive action allowable?
Gentili provides specific guidelines as well for the circumstances in
which anticipatory action may be taken. These criteria are closely tailored
to those situations which Gentili viewed in his lifetime, as well as those
which could be imagined as likely given the shifting power structure and
political organization within and among the European states. Gentili
first states that anticipatory action, as with all war, must be based on a
just cause, and given the nature of anticipatory intervention, suspicion is
not enough. 135 In the case of anticipatory action, Gentili defines a just
cause as a dust fear, and "ajust fear is defined as the fear of a greater
evil....
The question, of course, then becomes how to objectively
define a just fear and determine the definition of greater evil. Gentili
answers these questions by calling for all to unite in the opposition of
common danger, 137 and continues:
But since there is more than one justifiable cause for fear ...we will merely say
this, which had always been a powerful argument and must be considered so today and hereafter: namely, that we should oppose powerful and ambitious
chiefs.
For they are content with no bounds and end by attacking the fortunes of
13 8
all.

While at first glance it may appear as though Gentili is advocating
initiating force against a rising power before it has a chance to increase
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

GENILI, DE JURE BELLI, supra note 4, at 58 (see quote at note 118).
Id. at 63.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 65.
Id.at 64.
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its relative strength, he does not actually advocate something as simple
as this brand of realism. He further states:
[A] defence is just which anticipates dangers that are already meditated and
prepared, and also those which are not meditated, but are probable and possible.
This last word, however, is not to be taken literally, for in that case my
statement would be that it is just to resort to a war of this kind as soon as any
one becomes too powerful, which I do not maintain. For what if a prince should
have his power increased by successions and elections? Will you assail him in
war because his power may, possibly
be dangerous to you? Some other reason
139
must be added for justice's sake.

What Gentili offers, in others words, as guidance for those instances in
which anticipatory force might be used, is a careful consideration of not
only the actions taken by the offending party-the level of military
preparedness, the extent of the hostility, the continuation of diplomatic
relations, and any recent adverse action-but also the overall circumstances
surrounding the proposed threat. A dictator threatening the balance of
power and unjustified expansion into new territory is not the same threat
to European stability as is a rightfully installed ruler who is successfully
building his country's economy such that the country is increasing its
power relative to others in the region. The former is a just cause for
anticipatory war, the latter is not. This is an especially important distinction
made by Gentili in his work, and particularly relevant for the time period
in which he lived because it limited the number of situations in which
anticipatory action could justly be taken; removing from the realm of
just causes the simple economic and political development that was
causing a shift in the power structure among the states of Europe.
8. Arbitration is Key
One additional contribution that Gentili made to the international rules
concerning war was the inclusion in his work on warfare of a rather
extensive discussion of the need for arbitration prior to military
engagement. 140 Gentili calls for arbitration prior to any act of war in order
for a war to be just. He states, "those who avoid this kind of contest by
arbitration and resort at once to the other, that is, to force, may
understand that they are setting theirfaces againstjustice, humanity,
and good precedent..4..,,141 This is an addition to the body of international
139.
140.
141.

Id.at 66.
Id. at 16.
Id.

law that exists largely thanks to Gentili's efforts as prior discussions of
international 42
law contained little or no emphasis on the peaceful settlement
of disputes. 1
Gentili was unlike many who came before him, as well as after, in that
he believed that war was not the normal human condition and therefore
he argued that there was a duty to seek peaceful settlement by negotiation,
arbitration, or other peaceful means. 143 This corresponds to the limits
Gentili added to the definition of war generally and the just causes of
anticipatory war in particular. Moreover, all of his contributions to the
laws of war reflect the period in which he lived, and his own personal
experience with warfare. Gentili was a witness to the internal wars of
religion, as well as a number of wars and almost-wars between states.
From his experience, Gentili sought to build a body of international law
that would allow states to use war when necessary-for, as described
above, there are situations in which Gentili did believe that war was
necessary'44-but at the same time ensure that these circumstances were
limited and that states had ample, practical means with which to resolve
their disputes without resort to war.
9. Human Rights Trump State's Rights
After providing the overall framework for his view of international
law as a body of rules designed to assist a clear population (i.e. states) in
their actions with each other, Gentili turns to a number of issues that
were being discussed in his day, and sought to provide guidance to states,
not only in their relations with each other but also in their relations, and
obligations, to their citizenry. Gentili's work in this way echoes that of
Machiavelli and presupposes that of Hobbes in which practical advice
for a strong state is interspersed with advice and counsel on the rights
and obligations a state has towards the citizens which compose it. In
fact, much of what Gentili was concerned with in his works was seeking
a balance between the rights and obligations of a state to its own
interests and preservation and the needs of human society as a whole.145
One of the principle areas in which Gentili focuses on this notion of
balance is the question of humanitarian intervention to protect a
population and whether this is viable under international law given the
142.

Ian Brownlie, The Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, in 39-40

ALBERiCO GENTILI: LA SOLUZIONE PACIFICA DELLE CONTROVERSIE INTERNAZIONALI: Atti

del Convegno: Nona Giornate Gentiliana, San Ginesio, Italy, September 29-30, 2000
(Milan: Dorr. A. Giuffr6 Editore 2003).
143. Brownlie, supra note 142, at 39-40.
144. Nys, supra note 7, at 34a (Gentili "admits that war is a legitimate means for
deciding conflicts between governments.").
145. TUCK, supra note 42, at 36.
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pre-eminence of the concept of state sovereignty. Gentili, in this discussion,
touches on a number of concepts that in modern parlance would be
considered under the umbrella of human rights. As mentioned above,
Gentili believed that fundamentally international law is positive law: law
is that which states agree is law and which guides their conduct in the
international system. 46 Gentili, however, also recognizes that there are
certain principles that are so fundamental that they are shared everywhere,
whether or not explicitly recognized by states, and these also become
rules of international law-although laws based on nature rather than
agreement. 47 It is into this latter group that Gentili's discussion of
humanitarian intervention and the rights of a people to expect certain
48
treatment from their government falls.1
It has been contended that the writings of Grotius were the first to
discuss the concept of humanitarian intervention. 149 Once again, however,
an examination of Gentili's work provides an even earlier formulation of
the concept of humanitarian intervention, and that Gentili is, in fact, the
concept's "true progenitor."150 Gentili considers humanitarian intervention as
part of the body of rules concerning just war. 15 Basing his position on the
unity of the human race, and importance of protecting human society as
a whole over a single individual, Gentili finds that sovereigns who abuse
their populations do not have greater rights than the population which
they make suffer. Therefore the rights of the many must be protected over
the rights of the individual, even if the individual happens
to be the
152
sovereign state, and in these cases intervention is justified.
146. See supra GENTILI, note 105, and accompanying text
147. See supra GENTILI, note 108, and accompanying text.
148. Kingsbury, supra note 41, at 715 (One of the key ways in which Gentili's
approach to international law can be considered important for today was his struggle with
how to apply a law of nations to many different peoples.).
149. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in InternationalLaw, 23 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L. L. 1, 46 (1946). (Grotius' writings contained the "first authoritative statement of the
principle of humanitarian intervention-the principle that exclusiveness of domestic
jurisdiction stops when outrage upon humanity begins.").
150. Theodor Meron, Common Rights of Mankind in Gentili, Grotius and Suarez,
85 AM. J. INT'L L. 110 (1991).
151.
GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI, supra note 4, at 122.

There remains now the one question concerning an honorable cause for waging
war.., which is undertaken for no private reasons of our own, but for the
common interest and in behalf of others. Look you, if men clearly sin against
the laws of nature and of mankind, I believe that any one whatsoever may
check such men by force of arms.
152. Id.at 75 (quoting Seneca, "[a]nd in my eyes a consideration of the duty which
I owe to the human race is prior and superior to that which I owe to any individual. This

Gentili applies these rules whether in the case of a state's own
population, or the population of another: "If subjects are treatedcruelly
and unjustly, this principle of defending them is approved by others as
well. ",53 Relying on his understanding of certain human rights as natural
rights that apply to all, Gentili considers such action to be justified by
international law even though such action leads to a violation of the
principle of state sovereignty. Gentili explains this seeming contradiction
by relying on the universal kinship shared among all peoples by the laws
of nature. He states that by allowing any individual to attempt to abolish
a component of this human society, "you will also destroy the union of the
human race, by which life is supported." 154 If a population, for whatever
reason, is not capable of defending itself against maltreatment by its
sovereign, then Gentili states that unless the community of states wishes
to exempt sovereigns from the law, which he argues would be disastrous,
then there is a corresponding necessity in international law to remind
them of their duty and hold them55 bound by it, even if this means
violating principles of sovereignty.1
10.

InternationalLaw Must Change With the Times

Gentili also argued that, as international law is made for nations and
not vice versa, it is therefore is subject to development and adaptation to
changing circumstances as needed. 56 In the same way that domestic
law must change to accommodate changing internal factors such as
religious freedom or the end of the feudal system, international law must
be able to adapt to the needs of the state in the international system. As
mentioned above, this was rarely a possibility under the body of
international legal doctrine put forth by the scholars throughout the
Middle Ages due to the grounding of all law, including international
law, in religious doctrine. That which is based on divine law is unable to
be altered by human beings. For Gentili, this was an impracticality that
would destroy even the most viable legal system. In fact, it was
Gentili's belief that law was not static which allowed him to address the
needs of the changing international system during his lifetime, solidifying
the importance of international law for peace and stability in the global
system rather than forgoing development of such law in the face of
significant changes.
is surely true, or else we put sovereigns on a different plane from all other men, if we
decide they have the right to act according to their whim and caprice.").
153. Id. at 75.
154. Id. at 74.
155. GENTILI, DE JuRE BELLI, supra note 4, at 74.
156. Phillipson, supra note 12, at 21a.
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V.

GENTILI's LEGACY: REFLECTING ON THE RENAISSANCE

It is clear that Gentili was an important contributor to the canon of
international law and deserves much recognition for the development of
many of the modern components of this legal body. Indeed, there is
much more of interest in Gentili's writings than this article's cursory
overview can cover. However, even this brief examination of some of
Gentili's key works provides insight into how the canon of international
law may develop, may be pushed forward, in times of change in order to
better serve its practical function of providing guidance to states acting
within the international system. In Gentili's time there was much
uncertainty over whether any rules existed, or could exist, between states
to guide them in their relations with one another at a time of such change
and turmoil. As described above, most areas of life-politics, economics,
religion, social relations-were touched by the changes occurring both
in the structure of the international system and the internal structures of
the states themselves. Existing rules of international law, passed down
from the societies of the Greeks and Romans and interpreted through the
lens of the Catholic scholars of the late-Middle Ages, provided little
guidance for the newly sovereign states on the most pressing issues of
the day.
It was a moment in time when any belief in the merits of a global
society governed by international law could have gone by the wayside in
favor of a world in which the strongest could do whatever they chose.
Living in one of the most powerful countries in the world at the time,
Gentili easily could have adopted this position, using international legal
rules only when they advanced the position of England. This certainly
would have been an easy position to adopt. Gentili, however, did not
take the easy way out. Recognizing that while perhaps in the short-term
adapting a body of international rules to fit the vastly changed circumstance
of international society would be difficult and rife with setbacks, in the
long-term this continuous push towards a world governed by law would
be more beneficial to everyone, even the strongest powers. Moreover, as
a student of history, Gentili recognized that the strongest don't stay the
strongest forever, and it is in fact in their interests to participate in the
creation of international law while they are in a position of influence so
as to protect themselves for a time when they are not.
Gentili provided a body of international law to address these concerns,
one which pushed international law forward while maintaining continuity
with the foundational basis of the past. Given his prominence as advisor

to a number of states of Europe at the time, Gentili arguably succeeded
in his endeavors. And certainly those who continued the development of
the canon of international law in subsequent years owe much to Gentili's
achievements maintaining the relevance of international law in times of
great change.
Today, we face many of the same concerns regarding international law
that Gentili addressed 400 years ago: Does international law matter?
Would we be better off without the United Nations and a body of
international rules, particularly those of us in the United States, a
country with unparalleled military and economic power? And, even if
we do believe in the benefits of international law, how do we maintain a
universal body of rules in the face of rapidly changing and increasingly
diverse system of states? Is sovereignty an absolute or are there limits?
And if there are limits, what are they and who decides when they are
reached? Is international law even viable in an era of superpowers and
rogue states? How can we discuss the validity of anticipatory intervention
when only a handful of states in the world are capable of actually
engaging in such an action? How do we deal with those who act outside
the law, threatening both states and individuals alike? How can we
create a universal body of rights and obligations, when the different
societies of the globe are so diverse? Does religion have a place in law?
How can the developed nations require the developing nations to do
what they themselves did not? All of these questions that course through
modern international legal debates are the same foundational questions
wrestled with by Gentili 400 years ago. And while the globe is larger
and the extent of the diversity of those involved in the international
system of states greater than in Gentili's era, I would suggest that
Gentili's ten tenets of international law remain as valuable at the
beginning of the 21st century as they did at the beginning of the 17th
century.
Like Gentili, we mustn't give up on the benefits to be gained from
global system operating under the rubric of international law. The result
of accepting defeat of such a system will surely be a return to Hobbes'
war of all against all. Perhaps if we approach international law the way
Gentili did-not looking for absolute perfection and immediate results,
but rather moving forward in small steps and looking to history for guidance
in adapting international law to our changing needs-the continuing
difficulties of adapting international law to address the global concerns
of over 190 different nations won't seem so daunting. Revisiting
Gentili's ten tenets of international law, we can see their continued
relevance for today.
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A. InternationalLaw is Not National Law
One of the most common complaints heard today about international
law is that it is not really law. Not being made by a legislature or an
executive, and not having, in most cases, any punishment for failure to
comply, international law has frequently been viewed as simply a tool
states use when it suits their interests, but has no binding effect on state
action. This might make sense if you view international law as simply
an extension of domestic law, but if you view international law as a
unique legal system-serving its own purpose-recognizing the value
and the success of international law becomes more apparent. Of course
if you look at the success of international human rights principles the
same way you look at the protections offered by the U.S. Bill of Rights,
it is clear one has provided more concrete protection than the other. But,
it is important to remember, that many of the protections the Bill of
Rights offers today were not offered in the first 150 years of its existence.
Moreover, the two bodies of laws are different entities, designed to achieve
different things and both have had their difficulties and successes.
In today's era of instantaneous gratification many people are too quick
to criticize international law for moving too slowly, for not adequately
addressing all the concerns of everyone across the globe, and of being
ineffective when it comes to changing behavior or punishing noncompliance. It is expected that international law will act and react in the
same manner as domestic law, and that is simply an unrealistic expectation.
In the same way the common law systems and civil law systems and
Islamic law systems all have their differing rules and proceedings and
concerns, international law should be thought of as its own unique
system, and its benefits, problems, and successes judged in accordance
with its own unique tradition.
B. Religion andLaw Do Not Mix
With the rise of fundamental Islam as a force in international society,
coupled with the increase in Christian rhetoric in the public positions of
some of the leadership in the United States, questions about the role of
religion in international law have resurfaced. Largely dormant since the
end of the wars of religion in Europe, questions as to the role religion
should play in international relations and international law have come to
the forefront. This is a dangerous path for international law, as religious
difference is something which can not easily be reconciled given the

foundational nature of religious beliefs to people's views of the world.
Given this circumstance, it is important to remember the effort which
Gentili and his successors put in to removing religious bases from the
law of nations. As religion is an eternal belief, one in which change and
adaptation can be relatively difficult, it is important that this be kept
separate from a body of law which must remain fluid and adaptable.
A reincorporation of religion tenets in discussion of international law
risks the re-emergence of old divisions, many of which led to disastrous
conflicts centuries ago, and as we have seen even over the past five
years, have the potential to lead to much worse strife today. The religion
of everyone must be respected. But, as with the case of the national law
of every state, religion has no place in the daily business of global
society, including international law. This does not mean we should lose
our moral compass. But the commonalities among all religious-the
respect for life, the protection of children, the freedom of belief and
worship, the right to live one's life free from want and fear-are those
components which should guide our actions, not the specific religious
rules of any one faith; whether the faith be Christian, Muslim, Jewish, or
Hindu.
Imposing one's own standard of morality on others is no more a valid
and useful strategy today than it was at the turn of the 17th century. We
look back on the Inquisition and the wars of religion today and congratulate
ourselves on our increased tolerance and respect for all beliefs. But
when Christian conceptions of morality seep into the rhetoric of the
government of the most powerful country in the world, we must question
the direction we are headed. Equally, when nations and peoples of the
world carry out heinous acts under the banner of religion, we must
consider at what cost. Under the umbrella of this language it is easy to
question the usefulness or validity of international law--or for that
matter any legal principles written in the neutral language of the lawbut we must not return to an age in which religious rigidity was more of
a danger to international peace and security than almost any other aspect
of the international system.
C. Diversity is Beneficial Not Harmful
Today's international community is significantly more diverse than
that of Gentili, where the discovery of the Americas was just beginning
to expand the European imagination beyond the familiar. One of the
continuing criticisms of international law today is that it is incapable of
addressing the diverse needs of the large number of culturally different
nations across the globe. However, if not international law, then what?
National laws by their very nature are tailored to the culturally-constructed
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needs of individual states, but national laws don't often successfully
address issues such as terrorism, the build-up of weapons of mass
destruction, global warming, and the protections of people wherever they
go. Only international law can do that successfully. And, while not perfect,
it is again important to remember how far international law has come,
while at the same time incorporating the vast diversity around the globe.
Moreover, one of the key characteristics of the modem world is the
recognition that states are dependent on one another for their survival.
This means that the developed world is dependent on the developing
world, just as the developing world is dependent on it. It is easy to
forget this sometimes for those of us that live in the relative comfort of
the advanced, industrial nations. But our actions, and those actions of all
states around the globe, do not exist in isolation. For every additional
person being born, for every increase in the emission of greenhouse
gases, for every civil war that results in flows of refugees, for every
economic downturn and natural disaster, the results are felt across the
globe. There is no longer such as thing as an "isolationist" state, no matter
how hard some may try. Economic and technological development has
made this an interdependent world, and the only way for this to work is
through an interdependent understanding of the law.
D. Sovereignty is Not Absolute
It is more abundant than ever that international law can not succeed in
a world of absolute sovereignty. In the 400 years since Gentili advocated
limits on the sovereign rights of states, these limits have continually
been broken and restructured. Today, international law recognizes the
ability of states to intervene in the sovereign affairs of another state to
prevent genocide, alleviate widespread suffering-whether due to war or
environmental catastrophe, stem severe environmental degradation, and
prevent actions which will lead to conflict or global instability. There
remains, however, much disagreement among states as to the extent to
which each of these merits a violation of the principle of absolute
sovereignty.
In the modem context, the debate over the U.S. intervention in Iraq in
2003 clearly illustrates this point. Was the potential of Iraq's possession
of weapons of mass destruction a sufficiently imminent threat given the
level of death and destruction that may be caused by such weapons to
warrant intervention? Was the threat of Iraq's supporting terrorism post9/11 a sufficient threat? Was Saddam's treatment of his own people,

violating numerous human rights laws a sufficient justification? Was
Saddam's twelve year violation of U.N. Security Council's resolutions a
sufficient justification? There were so many questions and so many
different opinions that many argued that international law no longer
matters given the current state of the international system.
As Gentili suggested 400 years ago, however, decisions regarding the
appropriate use of anticipatory intervention will be difficult, and must be
decided on a case by case basis. There is no hard and fast rule, and there
is bound to be disagreement. What is important to remember, however,
is that the vast majority of the debate and disagreement over whether
anticipatory intervention was warranted in the Iraq case took place under
the rubric of international law and within the confines of the United
Nations. If international law did not exist, if it was not important, it is
likely that action would have been taken much sooner, and would likely
have been much worse. Simply because there is disagreement over the
law does not mean that we should forget the law. In fact, disagreements
are often required to ensure that the law moves forwards and doesn't stay
static. Much of what Gentili wrote about international law was controversial
and caused disagreement and debate. However, his perseverance ultimately
resulted in shifts in the perception of the use of the law of nations. Had
he not been willing to remain engaged, even in the face of disagreement
and difficulty, the situation in Europe in the 17th century possibly would
have been even more dire.
E. Those Who OperateOutside the Law Merit No
ProtectionFrom the Law
Whereas Gentili had his pirates and brigands, today we have terrorists.
There is much to be learned from Gentili's position as to how
international law should deal with those who operate outside the law.
First, it must be remembered, however, that those who operate outside
the law are different from those who operate contrary to the law. The
former should be dealt with swiftly and resolutely using any means
necessary that do not, in and of themselves, violate the law. The latter
should be dealt with through the appropriate legal channels already
existing for such purposes. There is, in other words, a difference between
dealing with an official government that participates in terrorism or
violates the human rights of its people and groups or individuals acting
on their own, outside the realm of law.
Terrorists are the modem brigands and pirates. While there are groups
that continue to be supported by or connected to official state governments,
much of the modem terrorism is not related to any state or official
government entity, but are rather groups acting because they believe that
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the appropriate course of action is not being taken by their government.
These groups pay attention to no law, whether national or international,
and operate completely outside of the law. Since they do not observe the
principles of international law in conducting their own actions, they may
not seek protections under international law from prosecution by other
states. While this tenet of Gentili's conception of international law may
be more aggressive than some would prefer, his reasoning remains
sound. The stability of the global system and the protection of the peoples
therein is the primary goal of both the state and the state system. Those
who seek to disrupt the state through unlawful means (in other words as
opposed to state action, which as discussed above, can sometimes include
warfare) must be stopped. There should not be concern for the rights of
those who do not consider the rights of others. Ignoring the problem, or
treating those with no disregard for the law and rights of others the same
way one would treat those who do recognize the law but for whatever
reason have breached it, is not beneficial for the international community.
Considering terrorism in this way may alleviates some of the difficulty
the international community has had in coming to terms with how to
handle the increased terrorism problem across the globe. Many remain
concerned with infringing on the fundamental rights of individual or the
sovereign rights of states. And while these are valid concerns and there
should be no rush to judgment concerning who is a terrorist (after all one
person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter), endless debate
over who may qualify as a terrorist and who does not should not be
allowed to continue. This in and of itself is harmful to the authority of
international law. If there are those who continually violate the rights of
others in the name of their own personal cause, without seeking redress
through the channels established by the law, as Gentili stated 400 years
ago, they should receive no protections from the law.
F. War is Sometimes Necessary Within the Rules of Law
Because of the potential dangers involved in warfare due to the existence
of weapons of mass destruction, the increase in the global population,
and the proximity of peoples and nations to one another, war is, justifiably
considered best avoided. This does not mean, however, that war is never
just. In the same way that sovereignty is not always absolute, war is not
always wrong. Gentili recognized this, and for him it strengthened the
abilities of international law. It is easier to uphold an international legal
system if reality is taken into account.

Given the destruction and devastation that the global community has
seen as a result of numerous wars over the course of its history, a
complete renunciation of war as an option is understandable, particularly
by those states which have seen the brunt of such conflicts. However,
international law is designed to uphold the peace and stability of the
entire globe and sometimes war is necessary to achieve this goal. As
with the case of those operating outside the law described above, endless
discussion and debate will not always solve the problem, and may in
some cases make the situation worse. There are times when action is
called for, and a clear understanding of this formulated under the law of
nations will make this body of law more relevant to the modern era.
G. Arbitration is Key
While warfare may be allowable under certain circumstances, the
preference should always be first for negotiation, arbitration and agreement.
Moreover, given the interdependent nature of the modem global system,
multilateral negotiation should be preferred to bilateral negotiation
whenever appropriate and feasible. As international law is a communal
endeavor, the strength of the system will be made stronger through
multilateral efforts, even if disagreement may occur during the course of
those efforts. At the same time, however, arbitration should not be allowed
to go on indefinitely, nor should discussion stand in the way of action
when action is warranted.
One of the key concerns many skeptics have about international law in
the modern era is the seemingly endless debates and discussions which
often accompany any attempts to create or enforce international law.
For international law to remain a viable system there must indeed be
negotiation, but there also must be action. Gentili recognized this 400
years ago and we must not be afraid to recognize it today.
H. Human Rights Trump State's Rights
It is easy to forget this adage since foreign affairs are conducted by
states at a level often far removed from the day to day lives of their
people. But in the same way that national laws are really put into place
for the individual people within the state, not the state itself, so are
international laws created. If the citizens within a state are being persecuted
or suffering, what good is any peaceful and stable international system?
Who is it peaceful and stable for? This is why Gentili advocated at the
turn of the 17th century, and we must emphasize today, there are certain
rights that are so fundamental to the lives of every person on the planet
that there is no other rule of law-whether national or international, nor
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action taken in furtherance of interests, that should be allowed to trample
these rights.
Genocide, slavery, crimes against humanity, widespread suffering whether
from the actions of government, god, or nature should be addressed by
international law and the international community of states. It is these
foundations upon which a stable international system rests. Those who
suffer have nothing to lose by turning to actions outside of the law. This
is destabilizing for everyone. Remembering the importance of these
protections above all else will stabilize the international legal system,
engendering support for international law and silencing the critics.
I. InternationalLaw Must Change With the Times
Finally, one of the most important contributions that Gentili made to
the understanding of international law was the recognition that international
law must change with the times. When international law stemmed from
the Catholic tradition this idea was inconceivable as no law which
stemmed from God could be altered by anyone but God. Change, therefore,
was impossible. Gentili recognized, however, that this point of view doomed
international law to failure. The international system of states is in constant
flux. How can it not be with over 200 vastly diverse members? International
law must be adaptable and it is recognition of this adaptability which
ultimate provides the system of international law with the ability to
persevere, despite the call of those who say international law is dead.
While the current international legal system under the rubric of the
United Nations may not have been as effective as it could have been in
the past few years, the possibilities for what could have been without the
legal guidance provided by the United Nations and international law are
even worse. Moreover, when we think back to where the system of
international law was during Gentili's time, or where it even was 60
years ago at the end of World War II we can see how much international
law has been able to adapt and change with the times. It is unrealistic to
expect the same swiftness of response under international law than is
available in national legal systems. But that doesn't mean that international
law is no a dynamic system of law capable of addressing the current
problems in the world. Those who create, amend, interpret and enforce
international law simply have to recognize that it does change with the
times, that change may come slowly, but abandoning the system of
international law will not bring any positive change at all.

VI. CONCLUSION

As in the late 16th and early 17th centuries, the late 20th and early
21st centuries have seen substantial changes in the international system,
as well as within the internal structures of states. These changes today
maintain at their foundations many of the same foundations as those of
Gentili's era: expansion of the number of states and questions of sovereignty
and correspondingly limits on that sovereignty; questions of justifications
for and rules regarding warfare and how to deal with those who do not
abide by these rules; questions of the rights of peoples and the obligations of
states towards their own populations as well as all people; and questions
concerning the freedom of states to engage in economic and political
development.
While in Gentili's time it was the emergence for the first time of
notions of national sovereignty contrasted with the universal authority of
the Church, and whether non-Christians have rights and obligations,
today it is the emergence of new states struggling to become democratic
after years of oppression and the questions of the role of smaller states in
the face of the correspondingly greater power of those which are wellestablished. For Gentili it was a question of whether universal notions
of rights and protections applied to the Turks or the Amerindians, today
it is a question of how we can create a body of universal human rights
that accommodate a multitude of different religions and cultures which
might view different rights in different ways. Finally, as in Gentili's
time it was a question of dealing with brigands and pirates who sought to
disrupt the newly emerging political and economic system by acting
outside the law, today it is a question of terrorists and whether states
who act against the laws of nations are bound by any rules themselves.
As a lawyer and legal scholar first and foremost, Alberico Gentili's
goal was to provide practical advice for leaders, diplomats, and scholars
in order to facilitate the process of international relations and ensure
peace and stability as best as possible. He did not believe war and
conflict could be removed from international relations, but rather that
ensuring a well-founded framework of agreed upon and understood rules
exists makes it less likely that conflict will occur and more likely that a
peaceful resolution may be found when it does. Focusing on the changes in
the international system, and allowing that international law must remain
a constant, but also that it must be able to change as circumstances
change, makes Gentili's commentary of particular relevance today.
Gentili's world was, of course, vastly different from our own. However,
his approach to international law-briefly covered here through ten of
his key tenets-was one which believed that a global system with
international law was better than one without. Reviewing how many
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similarities there are between Gentili's time and our own should foster
the same belief in the international community today.

344

